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1 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
2 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
3 See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (2004) (discussing explosive growth of
arbitration cases administered by such arbitration groups as American Arbitration
Association, National Arbitration Forum, and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,
Inc.).
4 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
5 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991).
6 Id. at 25 n.2 (“Section 1 of the FAA provides that ‘nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’ ”) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).  The court declined
to address the scope of the phrase “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”  Id.
I.  INTRODUCTION
These days, it is hard to escape from arbitration agreements.
Arbitration is not new; Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) in 19251 to ensure that states would enforce arbitration
agreements.2  In the 1990s, however, the use of arbitration clauses
in consumer and employment contracts exploded.3  Such agreements
generally require that parties bring any common law or statutory
claims arising out of the relationship to arbitration, rather than
litigating such claims in court.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court resolved
any lingering questions about the per se enforceability of arbitration
agreements in the employment context.4  In the 1991 case Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court had held that the FAA
required the enforcement of an arbitration agreement between a
securities analyst and his former employer, even as to the analyst’s
claim of age discrimination.5  The Gilmer arbitration agreement,
however, was in a securities registration application, and the Court
had not yet resolved whether the FAA applied to agreements set
forth in employment contracts.6  In Circuit City, the Court held that
the FAA required enforcement of arbitration agreements between
almost all employers and employees with the sole exception of
4 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
7 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.  The Court held that § 1 of the FAA applied only to
transportation workers’ contracts of employment, namely, “those workers ‘actually engaged
in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.’ ”  Id. at 112 (citation omitted).  The purpose
of this exclusion is somewhat unclear; as the Court noted in Circuit City, the legislative history
of § 1 is “quite sparse.”  Id. at 119.
8 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002).
9 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 454 (1996) (arguing that courts should not enforce executory employment
arbitration agreements); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019
(1996) (discussing trend toward mandatory arbitration at expense of workers’ rights).
10 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:  Rights “Waived” and Lost
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383-84 (1996) (arguing that arbitration
in the employment context is “procedurally defective”); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims:  Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 1, 52-53 (1996) (pointing out difficulty in adopting arbitration standards that promote
fairness and public policy); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration:  Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 135 (1996)
(arguing that mandatory arbitration agreements for employment disputes should not be
enforced); Stone, supra note 9, at 1020 (arguing mandatory arbitration “threatens to deprive
workers of their statutory rights”).
11 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27; Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
12 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
13 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
employees directly involved in interstate transportation.7  Ironically,
Circuit City did not prevail in its own landmark decision.  The Ninth
Circuit denied enforcement of the arbitration agreement after
concluding it was substantively and procedurally unconscionable.8
The history of the Circuit City case highlights an important shift
in the discussion about employment arbitration agreements.
Initially following Gilmer, commentators criticized the premise that
employment arbitration agreements should be enforceable per se.9
A flurry of articles in the mid-1990s attacked the Gilmer premise,
questioning whether arbitration could ever provide relief for
violations of federal statutory rights, particularly antidiscrimination
rights.10  However, the Court’s analysis in Gilmer and Circuit City
found that the FAA requires the general enforcement of arbitration
agreements.11  The Court noted that the purpose of the FAA “was to
place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts.”12  Since the parties made an agreement to arbitrate, they
“should be held to it.”13
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14 Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor, 473 U.S. at 627).
15 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Alexander
v. Anthony Int’l, 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding “take-it-or-leave-it” agreement
procedurally unconscionable and limitation on employee relief substantively unconscionable);
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666-68 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding
arbitration agreement despite employee’s arguments of unconscionability, lack of
consideration, and insufficient bases for waiver); Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 1212,
1217-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding arbitration agreement not procedurally
unconscionable because employee had access to arbitration policy prior to signing).
16 EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 470 (6th ed. 2003).
17 See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:  An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 212-13 (2000) (discussing arbitration incentives where
litigation is socially undesirable); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:  An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1995) (arguing that arbitration agreement enforcement
increases social welfare).  For this Article, I will use the term efficient in its broadest form:
The contract paradigm applied to arbitration agreements,
however, does not require that every such agreement must be
enforced.  As the Court noted in Gilmer, an agreement to arbitrate
may be unenforceable if such agreement “resulted from the sort of
fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds
‘for the revocation of any contract.’ ”14  Thus, state and federal courts
are now grappling with common-law contract doctrines as applied to
particular employment arbitration agreements, with results such as
the Ninth Circuit’s determination in Circuit City that the agreement
was unconscionable.15
The cornerstone presumption of contract law is that contracts are
entered into freely by individuals who expect the contract to enhance
their individual utility.  Since rational actors would only agree to a
contract if they believe the contract will make them better off,
society can presume that each contract will enhance overall social
welfare.16  If these presumptions do not hold true in the context of
employment arbitration agreements, then a central justification for
their enforcement would be inapplicable.  We must therefore ask:
Why are employees and employers making these agreements?  Are
these agreements being formed because each side believes it will be
better off?
Using traditional law and economics models, influential
commentators have argued that this must be the case.  Simply
stated, these scholars have found that arbitration agreements
increase overall efficiency by allowing the parties to choose a more
efficient method of dispute resolution.17  The purpose of this Article
6 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
Efficient shall mean the result that provides for the greatest overall social utility.  RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-16 (6th ed. 2003).  I differentiate general efficiency
from Pareto efficiency in the usual manner:  An efficient result is one in which the parties are
better off overall, although an individual party may be worse off; whereas, all parties are
better off when a result is Pareto efficient.  See id. at 13-14 (comparing Pareto superiority with
Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency).
is to question this conclusion.  In examining the law and economics
of these agreements, I start by unpacking the considerations that go
into the making of the agreements themselves.  In creating a model
of this decisionmaking process, I hope to show how economically
rational employees and employers might go about making such
decisions.  This model sets forth the many factors an employee would
need to know in order to make a rational economic decision about an
arbitration agreement.  The model also incorporates recent
developments in the field of behavioral law and economics
concerning systematic irrationalities that may influence the process.
By trying to envision the actual decision to sign such agreements, I
endeavor to establish a new starting point for debates about the
wisdom of enforcing such agreements.
Part II establishes the basic economic model for agreements to
arbitrate employment claims.  I begin with a model for arbitration
agreements that are executed after the claim has arisen—also
known as postdispute arbitration agreements.  After developing this
model, I use it as the basis for a more complicated model for signing
an agreement at the beginning of the employment relationship—a
predispute arbitration agreement.  As the model will demonstrate,
the information necessary to determine the efficiency of a predispute
agreement is likely to be unavailable to employees who contemplate
such agreements.  Faced with this dilemma, employees may fall back
onto decisionmaking shortcuts, known as heuristics, which may lead
them to an inefficient result.  Thus, the cost-benefit analysis that
employees can make about a postdispute agreement to arbitrate is
more likely to be accurate, and thus more likely to produce an
efficient result, than the analysis that employees can make about a
predispute agreement.
Part III considers whether predispute employment arbitration
agreements might still be efficient despite their underlying
informational deficiencies.  One possibility is that predispute
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18 Exceptions to this general rule include contracts to commit a crime, surrogacy contracts,
and waivers of certain statutory rights.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178
(1978) (stating exception for contracts to commit a crime); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250
(N.J. 1988) (voiding mother’s contract to sell her surrogacy child); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (stating that employees cannot waive Title VII rights).
19 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State:  A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995) (“In the area of contract law, the efficiency argument
concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary contracts that do not produce negative
externalities, regardless of their distributive consequences.  If a contract is voluntary, then it
presumptively improves the well-being of both parties.”).
20 For a discussion of other potential justifications for enforcing contracts, see Randy
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986).
agreements provide some additional benefit by locking the parties in
before the dispute has arisen.  Another possibility is that employees
will irrationally refrain from entering arbitration agreements after
a dispute has arisen.  A third possibility is that predispute
agreements are more efficient because they reduce externalities such
as judicial administration costs.  Part IV sets forth some parameters
for the next generation of debate.
II.  MODELING THE DECISION TO ARBITRATE
Free exchange is the cornerstone of capitalism.  Exchange is what
allows individuals to maximize their utility, since individuals can
specialize in producing one good or service but then acquire the
panoply of other necessities through purchase or trade.  Freedom of
exchange through contract is the cornerstone of our commercial legal
regime.  The general rule in contracts is that people are free to agree
to just about any type of exchange and have those agreements
enforced in a court of law.18  The theory behind freedom of contract
is simple:  Parties will come to an agreement only if they believe that
it is in their best interests to do so.  Given that both parties think
the agreement will improve their utility, people should be permitted
to make such agreements and have them enforced in the future.19
Of course, some parties will change their mind about the costs and
benefits of the bargain as the agreement plays out.  Markets may
rise and fall, and personal circumstances may change.  Overall,
however, society is better off if freely entered agreements are
enforced.20
8 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
21 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 110-13 (distinguishing between lie and failure to
disclose).
22 For example, contract law allows parties to void some agreements on the basis of
mistake.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.1-9.4 (3d ed. 1999).
23 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing people as rational maximizers of self-
interest).
24 Id. at 18.
Although freedom of contract is essential to our economic system,
economic theory recognizes that freely formed contracts will not
always be efficient.  If parties knew exactly what the outcome of each
contract would be, they would know the costs and benefits and would
be able to determine each contract’s relative efficiency.  But parties
do not always have perfect information, and parties may sometime
be mistaken about the effect a contract will have on their social
utility.  The most obvious example of this phenomenon is fraud.
When one party contracts to buy an authentic antique, his utility
will be reduced if that “antique” is later discovered to be a clever
knockoff.21  But parties often contract with incomplete and incorrect
information, and they may not always choose an outcome that
improves their utility.  While contract law has delineated some such
agreements as unenforceable,22 there is no general principle that
only efficient agreements will be enforced.  Instead, our system
presumes that parties will act rationally and will have sufficient
information to make generally efficient decisions.23
Economists recognize, however, parties do not always have
sufficient information.  In fact, it is sometimes rational not to have
such information; for example, the costs of obtaining this
information could outweigh the benefits derived from the
information.24  If we know a certain type of contract will require
information that will be systematically too costly to obtain, we may
question whether such contracts actually do increase societal
efficiency.  In the face of incomplete information, parties may
systematically fail to make efficient decisions about contracts,
particularly if they do not recognize or identify this information
failure.
For reasons discussed below, I believe that employment
arbitration agreements are an example of contracts formed with
cripplingly imperfect information.  We can obtain insight into this
possibility by modeling the actual decisions made by parties to
2004] EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 9
25 For purposes of this Article, arbitration means a method of dispute resolution in which
the parties present their case to an arbitrator or arbitrators, who then issue a binding decision
on the case.  Interestingly, there is no definition of arbitration in the Federal Arbitration Act.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
26 This analysis is based on a version of expected utility theory common to law and
economics analysis.  The crux of the theory is that rational economic actors will choose
between various options by selecting the option with the highest expected utility.
Decisionmakers must determine the various utilities that each option represents, modified by
the probability that the utility will occur.  For a discussion of expected utility theory in legal
analysis, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1062-64 (2000).
27 This litigation model is based on models developed and used in seminal law and
economics analyses.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 567-71 (discussing formula for
execute these contracts.  What follows is an effort to model the
processes that inform decisions to arbitrate or litigate, both before
and after disputes have arisen.  I begin with the simpler model:  the
decision to arbitrate or litigate after the dispute has arisen.
A. THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BEHIND THE POSTDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
In our system of dispute resolution, litigation is the “default
rule”—the result that will take place unless the parties agree to a
different alternative.  One possible alternative to litigation is
arbitration.25  The decision to take a legal dispute to arbitration,
rather than to the court system, is one that a party will make only
if he or she will be better off in arbitration.  This decision can be
made by weighing the costs and benefits of both options.26
The potential costs and benefits of litigation to the party bringing
the suit are the expected relief that will be granted minus the costs
of bringing the suit in the first place.  The expected relief is the
value of the likely damages (and other relief) discounted by the
probability that the party will win the suit.  The cost-benefit analysis
of such a decision could be expressed as:
P * R – C,
where P is the probability of success, R is the value of the expected
relief, and C is the cost of bringing the suit (attorneys’ fees, court
costs, and so forth).27  By conducting the analysis for both arbitration
10 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
condition for litigation to occur); Hylton, supra note 17, at 218-29 (presenting models of
litigation and arbitration in context of social value); Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks:  Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1268-70 (2002)
(discussing models of expected value and probable outcome of litigation); George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-12 (1984)
(discussing formulations of parties’ expectations); Shavell, supra note 17, at 23 (presenting
standard model of litigation).  The cost variable C also includes various nondirect costs, such
as the cost of publicity if the suit is litigated.  In the examples provided, I assume such costs
are zero.
28 This model assumes a noncontingency fee arrangement.  If the attorney were working
on contingency, the equation would be P * (R – C), rather than P * R – C.
and litigation, an employee could determine which alternative
offered the most utility by determining which alternative provided
the higher value.  Thus, the decision to choose arbitration over
litigation could be expressed as:
Pa * Ra – Ca > Pl * Rl – Cl. 
Such a calculation might proceed as follows:  Employee Amy has a
claim against her employer.  She knows that if she litigates the
claim, she would have a 70% chance of winning an average award of
$10,000.  But she knows that her costs, including attorney’s fees,
would be $3,000.28  If she chooses arbitration, she knows she would
only have a 60% chance of winning $8,000.  Her costs, however,
would only be $500.  Since the net expected utility of litigation would
be (0.7 * $10,000) – $3,000, or $4,000, and the net expected utility of
arbitration would be (0.6 * $8,000) – $500, or $4,300, Amy would
choose arbitration.
The party defending the lawsuit would also use a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether it desired to go to arbitration or
litigation.  When defending a suit, the expected relief has a negative
value rather than a positive value.  Thus, defendants try to minimize
their losses rather than maximize their gains.  In choosing between
arbitration and litigation, Amy’s employer, AA Co., would conduct an
analysis similar to Amy’s, except that AA Co. would try to minimize
the expected relief rather than maximize it, and AA Co.’s costs for
both litigation and arbitration would be different.  Thus, if AA Co.
has costs of $1,000 for litigation and $500 for arbitration, the net
expected value of litigation would be calculated as (0.7 * -$10,000) –
$1,000, or -$8,000, and the net expected value of arbitration would
2004] EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 11
29 For purposes of this model, I assume both parties have perfect information about the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success and the potential for relief.  Many litigation models assume that
the parties will have different expectations about their likelihood of success.  The possibility
for such divergence is discussed later in this section. 
30 For example, the probability of success and expected-relief factors could encompass a
variety of possibilities:  a 40% chance of getting nothing, a 20% chance of getting $10,000, a
20% chance of getting $30,000, a 15% chance of getting $60,000, a 4% chance of getting
$200,000, and a 1% chance of getting $1,000,000.
31 Expressed using variables, since (Pa * Ra) < (Pl * Rl), and Ca < Cl, and since an employer
seeks to reduce its costs, it will always choose arbitration.
32 Expressed as a calculation, the employee will choose arbitration if:
(Cl – Ca) > (Pl * Rl) – (Pa * Ra).
33 E.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws:  The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564 (2001)
(arguing that claimants may win more cases in arbitration than in court).
be (0.6 * -$8,000) – $500, or -$5,300.29  AA Co. would also choose
arbitration.
Obviously, this cost-benefit analysis is a simplified version of a
much more complicated assessment of litigation and arbitration
outcomes.30  But the factors discussed above are the basic factors by
which the parties would make their assessments about choice of
forum.  Moreover, if we can make certain assumptions about those
factors, we can make certain predictions about how the parties will
behave.  For example, if we assume that:  (1) litigation will always
have a higher expected relief (P * R) than arbitration for the
employee, and (2) costs for arbitration will always be lower for both
sides than will costs for litigation, then a rational employer will
always choose arbitration over litigation.31  Moreover, if we make the
same assumptions, an employee will choose arbitration if the
difference in costs between arbitration and litigation is greater than
the difference in expected relief between litigation and arbitration.
In the example above, the difference in costs for the employee was
$3,000 – $500, or $2,500, which is greater than the difference
between (0.7 * $10,000) and (0.6 * $8,000), or $2,200.32
Although the two assumptions about expected relief and costs of
litigation and arbitration discussed above may represent the
conventional wisdom on the subject, we cannot say empirically that
they are true.  Proponents of arbitration would argue with the
assumption that the employee always has a higher expected relief in
litigation than arbitration.33  Such proponents would argue
arbitrators should be no more biased against employees than juries,
12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
34 A recent study of employment arbitration and litigation among higher-paid employees
found no statistically significant differences between employee win rates or award levels in
arbitration and litigation.  Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration
and Litigation:  An Empirical Comparison 8 (2003) (Public Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper No. 65, NYU School of Law), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract$id=389780 [hereinafter Eisenberg & Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation].
For a  condensed version of this article, see Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration
and Litigation of Employment Claims:  An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RES. J. 44 (Nov.
2003/Jan. 2004).
35 A report by Public Citizen found no evidence that arbitration reduces the overall
transaction costs of litigation.  Public Citizen, The Costs of Arbitration (May 10, 2002), at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173.
36 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
783, 783 (1990) (discussing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960)).  The Coase Theorem has been the subject of intense academic discussion and debate
as to its meaning and validity.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained:
The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 398 (1997) (arguing that Coase
never believed his Theorem applied to real world); Stephen G. Medema, Through a Glass
Darkly or Just Wearing Dark Glasses?  Posin, Coase, and the Coase Theorem, 62 TENN. L. REV.
1041, 1041 n.4 (1995) (citing attempts to “prove, disprove, confirm, or refute the Coase
Theorem”); Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem:  Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV.
797, 799 (1994) (arguing Coase Theorem is “in error”).  Although I do not wish to wade into
this debate, the Coase Theorem seems logical within its fairly constrained paradigm.
and an arbitral award might have a higher expected value since it
would be granted more quickly than a litigation award.34  However,
opponents of arbitration would argue that litigation costs will not
necessarily be higher than arbitration costs, especially given the
need to pay for the arbitrators themselves.35  This Article makes no
effort to ascertain whether arbitration is generally more or less fair
or more or less expensive.  My point here is that economically
rational employers and employees would calculate the costs and
benefits of an arbitration agreement before deciding to sign and
would only execute the agreement if the benefits outweigh the costs.
In the hypothetical above, the decision to choose arbitration over
litigation is efficient for both Amy and AA Co., leading them both to
choose it independently.  What if arbitration was a better deal for
the employer, but the employee expected a better result from
litigation?  If they have perfect knowledge, we still expect the parties
to choose the forum that provides the greatest utility for both parties
as a whole.  The Coase Theorem teaches us that the initial
assignment of rights—in this example, the right of the employee to
choose litigation—should not stand in the way of arbitration if
arbitration is the more efficient result.36  If the parties have perfect
2004] EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 13
37 Cf. Hylton, supra note 17, at 212 n.5 (“[A]mong informed parties the incentive to waive
the right to litigate is observed when and only when litigation reduces society’s wealth.”).
38 This equation could also be represented as arbitration will be chosen if: 
(Ca(ee)  + Ca(er)) < (Cl(ee) + Cl(er)).
information and can freely bargain, then the employer would
bargain with the employee to choose arbitration.  Although
arbitration alone would make the employee worse off than litigation,
the employer would offer to compensate the employee sufficiently so
that the employee would find it more advantageous to choose
arbitration.  Ultimately, the parties would agree to whichever
outcome would be more efficient overall.37
In order to model this process, we need to compare the employee’s
cost-benefit analysis with the employer’s cost-benefit analysis.
When calculating combined utility for the two parties, we would
compare the joint utilities of arbitration with the joint utilities of
litigation.  Thus, the parties would choose arbitration if the expected
value of arbitration is greater than the expected value of litigation,
or:
(Pa * Ra) – Ca(ee) + (Pa * -Ra) – Ca(er) > (Pl * Rl) – Cl(ee) + (Pl * -Rl) – Cl(er).
Interestingly, the expected relief (P * R) drops out of the equation
since the value of the expected relief is the same for both parties, but
expected relief is a benefit for the employee (P * R) and a cost for the
employer (P * -R).  Thus, the calculation could simply be expressed
as arbitration will be chosen if:
– Ca(ee) – Ca(er) > – Cl(ee) – Cl(er).38
In other words, the parties would choose arbitration if the joint costs
of taking the claim to arbitration are less than the joint costs of
taking the claim to litigation.
This determination is significant because if the costs for both
parties are always less in one forum—say, arbitration—than the
other, then arbitration will always be the most efficient outcome.
And therefore, the employer and employee will always choose
arbitration if they have perfect knowledge and can bargain, no
matter how much more favorable arbitration is to one party.  As an
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39 I set litigation costs as lower than arbitration costs to weight Bob’s preference for
litigation even more heavily.
40 The $90,000 expected return to the employee through litigation is an expected $90,000
loss to the employer, and the $2,000 expected return to the employee through arbitration is
an expected $2,000 loss to the employer.
example, imagine a situation in which the arbitration is heavily
stacked in favor of the employer.  Employee Bob has a claim that has
a 90% chance of earning him $100,000 in litigation but only a 10%
chance of earning him $20,000 in arbitration.  His costs in litigation
would be $400, and his costs in arbitration would be $500.39  Bob
would readily choose litigation after making the following cost-
benefit analysis:
Pa * Ra – Ca < Pl * Rl – Cl
(0.1 * $20,000) – $500 = $1,500 < (0.9 * $100,000) – $400 = $89,600.
In comparing the possible outcomes of arbitration and litigation, the
employer, BB Inc., faces the same probability of loss as Bob faces for
gain:  a 90% chance of losing $100,000 in litigation, but only a 10%
chance of losing $20,000 in arbitration.  Assume, however, that BB
Inc. has costs of $2,000 in litigation and $500 in arbitration.  Thus,
BB Inc. would want to pursue arbitration based on the following
analysis:
(0.1 * -$20,000) – $500 = -$2,500 > (0.9 * -$100,000) – $2,000 = 
-$92,000.
As discussed above, joint utility is calculated solely based on the
costs of both methods since the expected returns for both sides cancel
each other out.40  The following equation illustrates that arbitration
has a higher joint utility than litigation:
– Ca(ee) ($500) – Ca(er) ($500) = -$1,000 >  – Cl(ee) ($400) – Cl(er) 
($2,000) = -$2,400.
Arbitration will save the parties $1,400 in joint efficiency.
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41 For Bob, the arbitration result ($1,500) is $88,100 less than the litigation result
($89,600), while for BB Inc. the arbitration result (-$2,500) is $89,500 more than the litigation
result (-$92,000).
42 Note that this payment is only necessary because the employee has a right to take the
case to litigation and therefore has a veto over arbitration.  The parties would choose
arbitration without any exchange of funds if arbitration was the societal default.
How would the employer convince the employee to take the case
to arbitration?  BB Inc. would have to pay Bob the difference in
utility.  Since litigation has a greater utility of $88,100 for Bob, but
arbitration has a greater utility of $89,500 for BB Inc.,41 both parties
would be better off if BB Inc. paid Bob between $88,100.01 and
$89,499.99 to take the case to arbitration.  If the employer paid, say,
$89,000 to the employee, Bob’s calculation would be:
(0.1 * $20,000) – $500 + $89,000 = $90,500 (ARB) > (0.9 *
$100,000) – $400 = $89,600 (LIT),
while BB Inc.’s calculation would be:
(0.1 * -$20,000) – $500 – $89,000 = -$91,500 (ARB) > (0.9 * -$100,000)
– $2,000 = -$92,000 (LIT).
Thus, both parties would agree to arbitrate.  They would split the
efficiency surplus:  Bob would receive $900 of the surplus, and BB
Inc. would receive $500 of the surplus.
Thus, if the parties have perfect information and can freely
bargain, they will always choose the method of dispute resolution
with the lowest total cost for both sides.  In this example, arbitration
represented a double hit for employee Bob.  Not only was Bob’s
expected reward much greater in litigation than in arbitration, but
his costs were higher in arbitration as well.  However, since BB
Inc.’s costs were significantly higher in litigation than in arbitration,
it was more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration.  In order
to persuade Bob to choose this route, BB Inc. needs to pay Bob a
portion of the surplus generated by arbitration.  Even after paying
this large sum, BB Inc. will still be better off than if it had
litigated.42
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43 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 567 (“That cases are ever litigated rather than settled
might appear to violate the principle that when transaction costs are low, parties will
voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is possible.”); Russell Korobkin &
Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:  An Experimental Approach,
93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 112 (1994) (“As long as the costs of trial are higher than the costs of
settlement, and as long as both sides make an identical estimate of the likely outcome of the
trial, the case should settle.”).
44 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 568 (“Settlement might appear especially unlikely if the
parties, by virtue of having different information about the strength of their respective cases,
do not agree on the likely outcome of the litigation.”).
45 Settling the case will always be the more efficient choice, since settlement costs will
always be less than litigation costs.  In choosing between arbitration and litigation, however,
the parties may determine that litigation actually costs less than arbitration.  Thus, a failure
to reach an agreement to arbitrate will not always lead to an inefficient result, whereas the
failure to reach an agreement to settle will always lead to an inefficient result.
Of course, if the parties had perfect information about the
expected value of the claim, they would be able to settle the claim
and avoid incurring dispute resolution costs entirely.43  The decision
to litigate depends on uncertainty—uncertainty about the chance of
victory, the potential award, and the costs of litigating.  Parties may
not settle if they do not agree upon the basic components of the
decision to settle:  the probability the plaintiff will win, the expected
value of the plaintiff’s relief, and the costs incurred by both sides in
litigating.44  Since all of these components are predictions, parties
will have different sets of predictions.  The same holds true for the
decision to choose arbitration instead of litigation.  Once parties
have failed to settle their claim, they may then make a decision
about whether to take the claim to arbitration.  If the parties both
have perfect information about these various factors and can then
bargain over which outcome to choose, they will reach the most
efficient result.  But if the parties base their decision on different
sets of information, they may not come to the efficient conclusion.
The parties may either fail to agree on the most efficient outcome, or
they may both agree to the less efficient outcome.45  Again, an
example may best illustrate this.
As discussed, both employee and employer would choose
arbitration under the following scenario:  In litigation, employee
Amy has a 70% chance of winning an average award of $10,000, with
costs of $3,000.  In arbitration, Amy would have a 60% chance of
winning $8,000, with costs of $500.  Since the net expected utility of
arbitration would be (0.7 * $10,000) – $3,000, or $4,000, and the net
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litigation and $500 for arbitration, and thus, the net expected value of litigation for the
employer would be (0.7 * -$10,000) – $1,000, or -$8,000, and the net expected value of
arbitration would be (0.6 * -$8,000) – $500, or -$5,300.  Thus, the employer would only be
willing to pay Amy up to $2,700 to arbitrate rather than litigate.
expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8,000) – $500, or
$4,300, Amy should choose arbitration.  Suppose, however, that Amy
has information that leads her to calculate the expected benefits of
litigation and arbitration incorrectly.  For example, Amy may believe
that she has a 90% chance of winning $20,000 in litigation, but only
a 40% chance of winning $5,000 in arbitration.  Even with perfect
information about costs, Amy would make the incorrect decision to
litigate the case since her (incorrect) expected benefit of litigation
(0.9 * $20,000 – $3,000 = $15,000) would be much higher than her
(incorrect) expected benefit of arbitration (0.4 * $5,000 – $500 =
$1,500).  AA Co. would be unwilling to pay Amy the $13,500
necessary to convince her to arbitrate,46 and therefore, Amy would
inefficiently take the case to court.
As in all cost-benefit analyses, information is crucial to
determining whether to arbitrate or litigate.  Thus, the relative
efficiency of parties’ decisions to litigate or arbitrate will depend on
how closely their information about those two processes resembles
reality and how well their information predicts the results of those
two processes.  If parties consistently make poor predictions based
on incorrect assumptions about the differences between arbitration
and litigation, then parties may consistently make inefficient
decisions.  As illustrated in the hypothetical above, if employees
consistently overestimate their potential for litigation success and
underestimate their potential for arbitral success, they may
inefficiently choose litigation over arbitration.
Based on our cost-benefit model, we can draw several conclusions
about potential agreements to arbitrate employment claims after
those claims have arisen.  First, the forum with the lower costs will
be the more efficient choice.  Second, if the parties have perfect
information about the probability of success, the expected relief, and
the costs in each forum with respect to the claim at issue, the parties
will bargain to reach the most efficient outcome.  Third, if parties do
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an employer.
not have perfect information, they may end up in the less efficient
forum.
B. THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BEHIND THE PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
Thus far we have modeled the decision to arbitrate or litigate
after the employee’s dispute arose.  Predispute employment
arbitration agreements, however, are signed at the beginning of
employment, well before any disputes arise.  Although the types of
claims covered by a particular agreement are left up to the parties,
a standard scope of coverage is all claims arising from the course of
employment, including common-law claims as well as state and
federal statutory claims.47  In order to determine whether it is more
efficient to assign all of these claims to arbitration, both employers
and employees will want to know the same type of information as in
the postdispute context:  their probability of success in arbitration
and litigation, their expected gains (or losses) from both forums, and
their costs in both forums.  There is, of course, one major difference.
In the postdispute context, the parties know exactly what the
dispute is about and, therefore, what the legal claim will be.  In the
predispute context, however, the parties will have to predict the
types and the likelihood of the different claims that could arise
during the employment relationship.  Moreover, employees are often
asked to sign a predispute arbitration agreement as a condition of
employment.  As a result, employees must weigh the costs and
benefits of the agreement against the costs and benefits of taking
this job over a different job, which may or may not require a
predispute arbitration agreement.  The employee does not decide the
merits of arbitration versus litigation as a stand-alone proposition.
The employee must weigh this comparison against the costs and
benefits of the job offered as opposed to other potential jobs.  The
calculations are much more complicated.
As in the postdispute context, an employee will base the decision
to sign a predispute agreement on the probability of success, the
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48 This is true even if you limit the potential claims to a particular cause of action.  For
example, the expected relief would be much lower in a statistically based failure-to-promote
Title VII case than in a Title VII case involving termination for failure to accede to a sexual
quid pro quo.
49 In Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the Supreme Court set forth factors to
consider when making a punitive damages determination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.  527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999).
expected relief, and the costs of arbitration as compared with the
probability of success, the expected relief, and the costs of litigation.
This model in the postdispute context is expressed as:
Pa * Ra – Ca compared with Pl * Rl – Cl.
Rather than considering this with respect to one dispute with
ascertained facts and a cause (or causes) of action, the employee
must make the decision as to the potential causes of action that may
arise during her employment.  To be even more precise, the
employee must predict the myriad possibilities for different factual
scenarios involving employment law claims.  After all, potential
employment claims can vary widely in their expected likelihood of
success, amount of relief, and costs of litigation.48
How do we go about modeling this?  In the postdispute context,
the calculation was limited to determinations about the probability
of success, expected relief, and probable costs of the action that had
already arisen.  For example, in a potential Title VII case, the
employee would ask:  Given what happened, what are my chances
of success?  Is my case based on statistical data, or is there a
smoking gun proving direct discrimination?  The expected relief
could also be calculated by asking:  Did the employee lose wages?
Did the employee suffer personal pain, humiliation, and suffering?
Are punitive damages a possibility?  Employees and their attorneys
can work through the Kolstad factors49 to determine whether they
have a valid claim for punitive damages and whether the arbitration
forum will accept punitive damages claims.  Costs, primarily
attorney’s fees, are also possible to calculate by asking:  What is the
complexity of the case?  What is the evidence that each side has?
How long would a trial last?  Predictions about these matters can be
based on the actual case combined with relatively accessible
information about past cases.  The fact that most parties settle
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50 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”:  Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (stating most estimates find
that between 85% and 90% of cases resolve before trial).  Galanter and Cahill observe,
however, that many of these cases are resolved through judicial decisions on important or
dispositive motions or even through arbitration.  Id. at 1340.  They argue that two-thirds is
a better estimate of the number of cases that settle voluntarily (i.e., without a definitive
judicial ruling).  Id.
51 At best, analyses of limited pools of arbitration results may be found in academic or
practitioner publications.  See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation,
supra note 34, at 8 (finding “no statistically significant differences between arbitration and
litigation in employee win rates”).
supports the inference that parties can make rational calculations
on these matters.50
Consider, now, these calculations from the perspective of a
prospective employee.  Overall, the employee will be attempting to
determine the difference in value between taking claims to
arbitration and taking claims to litigation.  But how would an
employee go about figuring this out?  One possibility would be to rely
on statistics about the overall difference between arbitration
outcomes and litigation outcomes.  Obviously, though, aggregate
statistics are not the answer.  For starters, such statistics are not
readily available.51  But even if they were, they would only be a
crude approximation.  Settlements are not included in the statistics.
Employees who do not sign predispute agreements may be in a
position to achieve more lucrative settlements than employees who
sign arbitration agreements.  And since such settlements are
generally confidential, it is impossible to get a sense of the
difference.  In addition, national averages are at best a rough
approximation of the costs and benefits to this particular employee
working in this particular region at this particular firm in this
particular department.  Since parties have the freedom to craft their
own rules and procedures for the arbitral forum, the employee would
have to assess the system of rules and procedures offered by this
employer against the rules and procedures generally used in other
arbitrations.  Even if arbitration results are roughly comparable to
litigation results at the national level, this employer’s arbitration
system may have results that differ widely from the national
average.
However, the most crucial difference in the predispute context is
that the employee must factor in a new variable:  the likelihood that
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52 Although it would be possible to limit an arbitration agreement to cases concerning
violations of only certain laws, employment arbitration agreements generally include all
claims arising out of the course of employment.  See, e.g., JAMS Guide to Dispute Resolution
for Employment Programs and Sample Clause Language, available at http://www.jamsadr.
com/rules/employment$clauses.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) (showing sample arbitration
clause).
53 This comparison could also be expressed as: 
31n X * (Pa * Ra – Ca) as compared with 31n X * (P1 * R1 – C1).
any particular fact scenario involving a potential employment law
violation will arise during the course of employment.  In other
words, the employee will have to determine the likelihood that the
employer will violate any employment law covered under the
agreement.52  Thus, to be completely thorough, an employee would
have to (1) contemplate each of myriad different scenarios under
which the employee would be entitled to legal relief, (2) determine
the likelihood of each individual scenario, and (3) determine how
each scenario would fare in terms of probability of success, expected
relief, and costs in both litigation and arbitration.
Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for each agreement would have to
take all of these factors into account in comparing arbitration with
litigation.  This calculation might be expressed as follows:
[X(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a –
C(n)a)],
 
as compared with
[X(1) * (P(1)l * R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)l * R(n)l – 
C(n)l)].53
In this model, X is the probability of any particular factual scenario
arising, and n represents the total number of different scenarios an
employee could encounter during the course of employment.  The
other variables would remain the same but would need to be
calculated for each scenario.  The variable P(1)a, for example, would
represent the probability of success at arbitration for claims relating
to the first potential scenario.  Through this model, the employee is
calculating the probability of success, the expected relief, and the
costs for each possible fact scenario and then discounting the result
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54 If the employer paid Claire $1,900.01 to sign the arbitration agreement, her expected
value for the agreement would be $2,300 + $1,900.01, or $4,200.01.  The expected value of
litigation for Claire is $4,200.
by the probability that the scenario will occur.  The totals for all such
possible scenarios are then added together for arbitration and for
litigation, and the employee would choose whichever is higher.
An absurdly simplified example of such a calculation would be as
follows:  Employee Claire is going to work for an employer who
wants her to sign a predispute agreement to arbitrate.  She knows
that there is a 10% chance that she will be improperly denied
overtime compensation and a 5% chance that her supervisor will
blatantly discriminate against her because of her sex.  Under the
overtime compensation scenario, Claire has a 50% chance of winning
$10,000 from a jury, with costs of $1,000, while she has a 40%
chance of winning $8,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $500.
Under the supervisor discrimination scenario, she has an 80%
chance of winning $100,000 from a jury (including punitive
damages), with costs of $4,000, while she has an 80% chance of
winning $50,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $1,000.  Her
calculation would be as follows:
(0.1 * ((0.5 * $10,000) – $1,000)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $100,000) – $4,000))
= $400 + $3,800 = $4,200 under litigation 
and
(0.1 * ((0.4 * $8,000) – $500)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $50,000) – $1,000)) =
$350 + $1,950 = $2,300 under arbitration.
Thus, since the expected value of litigating the potential claims
would be $4,200, while the expected value of arbitrating the expected
claims would be $2,300, Claire would choose not to sign the
arbitration agreement, all else being equal.  Alternatively, Claire
would require a payment of at least $1,900.01 in exchange for
signing the arbitration agreement.54
If employees had perfect knowledge, they could determine the
efficiency of signing a predispute arbitration agreement, and they
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55 See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract:  The Law of the Employment
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 525 (2001).
A fundamental problem with enforcing [predispute waivers and arbitration
agreements] is the inability of employees and applicants to assess the
choices offered, because there is no contemporaneous and concrete
employment dispute at the time the employees or applicants agree to
forego litigation over past and present claims or to submit future claims to
arbitration.
Id.
could bargain with the employer to arrive at the most efficient
outcome.  But the likelihood that employees would have anything
approaching the necessary “perfect information” to make such a
decision is surely close to zero.55  In comparison to the information
available to employees in the postdispute context, predispute
information borders on fantasy.  After a dispute has arisen, the facts
of the dispute are largely known to employer and employee, and both
sides can make predictions about the likelihood of success, potential
damages, and potential costs.  But at the beginning of an
employment relationship, the employee would have to know the
likelihood of success, potential damages, and potential costs for
actions that have not yet happened.  In addition, an employee would
have to know the likelihood that those actions would take place.
While a new employee may have a hazy sense of the potential for
legal claims arising out of the workplace and may even have a sense
of whether this particular employer has a past history of illegal
activity, she would need clairvoyance to determine the likelihood
that her employer would violate her employment rights.  Even if the
employer kept meticulous track of previous violations and provided
data to new employees on arrival, that data would offer no guarantee
that past trends would continue into the future.  The hiring of a new
supervisor, an unexpected merger, and even the employee’s personal
choices about marriage, pregnancy, or dating could affect the
likelihood that the employer will violate the employee’s rights.
Moreover, new causes of action could arise, or courts could take a
stricter interpretation of existing statutes.
There is also a potential moral hazard problem.  “Moral hazard”
refers to the tendency of an insured person to relax his or her
precautionary measures because he or she no longer has to worry
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56 POSNER, supra note 17, at 109.
57 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 218 (arguing that deterring socially harmful conduct is
key social benefit from litigation).
58 Indeed, to the extent that the “employer” is a person—say, a sole proprietor—the
employer could engage in such activity if he or she derived utility from such behavior.
Although some individuals may derive utility from discrimination itself, this utility is
generally ignored for purposes of determining societal utility.  See generally GARY S. BECKER,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971) (discussing economic considerations of
discrimination).
59 Hylton, supra note 17, at 223.
60 Id.
about an unfavorable outcome.56  In the postdispute context, an
agreement to arbitrate will not affect an employer’s decision to
engage in prohibited conduct since the agreement applies only to an
event that has already occurred.  In the predispute context, however,
a binding agreement not to litigate may affect whether an employer
engages in prohibited behavior or whether an employer takes
precautionary measures against such behavior.57  If the arbitration
agreement changes the expected costs and benefits of engaging in
arguably prohibited behavior, the employer will have different
incentives with regard to that behavior.
This point is most simply shown by considering a predispute
agreement to waive all claims.  If an employee were to sign an
agreement waiving all potential statutory claims against the
employer, then the employer would have no incentive to prevent
such claims from arising.  The employer would have no incentive to
take precautionary efforts to prevent employees and managers from
engaging in activities that violate the employee’s rights.58  The
expected costs of litigation would normally provide a significant
“cost” to the illegal behavior and thereby justify taking
precautionary measures.  However, the elimination of potential
litigation by the waiver agreement removes those costs.
As Keith Hylton has pointed out, a predispute arbitration
agreement has much in common with a waiver agreement.59  “An
arbitration agreement, after all, is simply a form of waiver, in which
the plaintiff waives the right to sue in court rather than the right to
sue altogether.”60  If the arbitration agreement provides the parties
with a forum more favorable to the employer, the employer’s cost of
engaging in prohibited activity will be reduced.  That reduction may
in turn lead the employer to curtail its precautionary efforts.  The
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61 An example of such a situation is described by Keith N. Hylton in his article Agreements
to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:  An Economic Analysis.  Hylton, supra note 17, at 219,
224.  Hylton supposes that an employer’s agents could potentially be involved in an activity
that would cause $100 in damage to the employee.  Id.  If the employer takes care, the chance
of such an injury is 25%; if no care is taken, the chance of injury is 75%.  Id.  The cost of care
is $25.  Id.  Hylton then assumes that litigation would always correctly award the employee
$100 if the injury took place.  Id.  Under such a regime, the employer would take care because
the cost of taking care, $25 + (1/4 * $100) = $50, would be less than the cost of not taking care,
3/4 * $100 = $75.  However, suppose the employer and the employee had signed a predispute
arbitration agreement.  If the arbitral forum were biased against the employee such that the
employer was only held liable 25% of the time, the employer would not take care, .75 (.25 *
$100) = $18.75, rather than take care, $25 + (1/4 * (.25 * $100)) = $31.25.  Hylton’s example
also included the costs of arbitration, which I have left out for simplicity.
62 Or:  
31n Xa * (Pa * Ra – Ca) as compared with 31n X1 * (P1 * R1 – C1).
employer’s decision will be based on a comparison between the costs
of the precaution and the costs of the arbitral forum.  Of course, the
employer will not know exactly what damage the prohibited activity
will cause or the exact difference in bias between arbitration and
litigation.  But if an employer sets up a completely one-sided
arbitration regime, the employer will be able to discount the costs of
the prohibited activity significantly.  This may lead to a greater
probability that the employer will fail to take precautions against
such activity.61
In deciding whether to sign a predispute arbitration agreement,
the employee would have to take this “moral hazard” problem into
account.  The probability that a particular scenario raising
employment law issues would occur (represented by X in our
equation) would not be the same for arbitration and litigation.  If one
forum is more favorable to the employer than the other, then the
extent of the favorability will affect the employer’s probability of
engaging in the activity.  Thus, we must have separate probabilities
for arbitration.  The new analysis would be expressed:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a –
C(n)a)],
as compared with
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l * R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l * R(n)l –
C(n)l)].62
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63 One would expect that as the arbitral forum gets more unfair, the likelihood of
prohibited activity increases.  At some point, however, the arbitral forum becomes so unfair
that there is a likelihood of a successful challenge to the agreement.  Thus, the probability
function would not be strictly linear.
64 Exact figures of the percentage of employers who require employees to sign arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment are unavailable.  However, a number of high-profile
cases have involved such agreements.  See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff employer’s mandatory arbitration agreement
procedurally and substantively unconscionable); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (deciding employer’s mandatory arbitration contract enforceable where
employee was not required to pay costs of arbitration for statutory claim).
The only difference in this equation is that instead of X representing
the probability of the event in both sets of equations, Xa represents
arbitration and Xl represents litigation.  This is a small but
significant change because of the calculation it represents.  Now,
instead of just determining the probability that the employer will
engage in prohibited activity, the employee must determine that
probability as affected by two different adjudicatory forums.  The
difference will be determined by using the variances between the
expected costs of arbitration [(P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)], the expected
costs of litigation [(P(1)l * R(1)l – C(1)l)], and the costs of any
precautionary measures that could be taken.  This will vary for each
potential situation.63
To add another complicating factor, many (if not most) predispute
arbitration agreements are not separately negotiated; they are
instead part of the overall employment package offered to the
employee.64  Thus, the employee cannot look at the agreement
separately and decide whether the agreement, standing alone, will
increase the employee’s utility.  Instead, the employee has to weigh
the expected value of the arbitration agreement in conjunction with
the overall expected utility of taking the particular job.  Imagine a
prospective employee, having gone through a job search and
interview process, who is then presented with a predispute
arbitration agreement to sign prior to full-time employment.  The
employer may treat it like just another of the many forms that the
employee must complete.  If the employer expresses a willingness to
talk about and negotiate the agreement, then the employee has an
incentive to perform an independent cost-benefit analysis.  But if the
employer presents the agreement as a condition of employment, the
employee has no choice about the content of the agreement.  Instead,
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the employee must weigh the costs and benefits of accepting the job
at hand (including the predispute arbitration agreement) against the
costs and benefits of going back on the job market.  A simplified
version of such a decision would be:  
Jj1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a –
C(n)a)],
  
as compared with
(Dj2 * (Jj2 + "j2)) + (Dj3 * (Jj3+ "j3)) + . . . + (Djn * (Jjn+ "jn)).
In this model, Jj1 is the sum of the overall costs and benefits of the
job on the table, such as wages, benefits, hours of work required,
type of work required, relationship with colleagues, prospects for
future promotion, and so on.  The only factor not included in Jj1
would be the estimated value of the predispute arbitration
agreement.  Of course, Jj1 represents an amalgam of costs and
benefits similar to the one constructed for the arbitration agreement.
The final expected value of the current job would be compared with
the expected values for all other possible jobs.
As for the other variables, jn represents the total number of
potential jobs available to the employee.  Variable J represents the
expected value for each other job that might be available (excluding
the arbitration issue), and D represents the probability that the
employee could get that job.  Variable " represents the expected
value of an arbitration agreement, if any, that would be required as
part of that potential job.  In other words, the employee does not
know whether other potential jobs will also require her to sign a
predispute arbitration agreement.  Thus, the employee would have
to determine the likelihood that the other job will require an
arbitration agreement as well as the expected value of such an
agreement (if offered).  To break down ", one could construct the
following equation:
" = (Parb * Varb).
28 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
65 This equation assumes that the employee has secured only one job.  If the employee is
choosing between two or more jobs, the employee would compare each job singularly with one
of the other jobs, as an employee can only have one full-time job at any given time. 
In the equation, Parb is the probability that the employer will require
an arbitration agreement, and Varb is the expected value of that
agreement (which may be positive or negative).
To be sure, in order to accept a job in the first place, the employee
would have to determine that the expected value of the offered job
is higher than the expected value of all alternative jobs.  Or
represented as an equation:
Jj1 > (Pj2 * Jj2) + (Dj3 * Jj3) + . . . + (Djn * Jjn).65
However, the addition of the arbitration agreement does provide a
significant complicating factor.  First, as discussed, the expected
value of the agreement itself is quite difficult to calculate.  Second,
even if that can be done, the employee must determine the
probability that other employers will also require such agreements
and, if they do, whether those agreements will have a similar
expected value.  After all, other employers may have fewer or greater
instances of statutory violations, those violations may be more or
less serious, or the arbitration procedures may be more or less fair.
Since each employer may differ on these factors, the employee would
have to develop separate analyses for each employer in order to be
completely accurate.
We have been considering the decision about a predispute
arbitration agreement from the perspective of an employee.  How
would an employer go about deciding whether to propose an
arbitration agreement?  The basic calculation should be the same:
whether the expected value of taking all claims to arbitration would
be greater than the expected value of taking the claims to litigation.
This calculation would have to account for the probability that such
claims would arise.  As noted above, the decision might be expressed
as:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a – C(n)a)],
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66 See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:  The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 40-49 (2003) (discussing
effects of employer efforts to reduce harassment).
67 See American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes (Jan. 1, 2004), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JS
as compared with
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l * R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l * R(n)l – C(n)l)].
Thus, the employer would also seem to be faced with a difficult
decision.  The employer, however, has several informational
advantages over employees when it comes to making this
calculation.
The employer has access to more information about the
probability that it will engage in the prohibited behavior X.  The
extent of the employer’s knowledge depends, in part, on the extent
to which one imparts the knowledge of the employer’s agents to the
employer itself.  For example, a sole proprietor knows all about his
or her own past history of, and proclivity for, prohibited activity.  A
large corporation, on the other hand, may not know what lurks in
the hearts of its middle managers.  It at least has information about
their past activities, however, and can make some predictions about
their future behavior.  Moreover, a large corporation can take
precautionary efforts to prevent or mitigate prohibited behavior:
screening applicants for evidence of illegal activity, training new
employees about legal rules and ethical conduct, and monitoring and
disciplining employees for violations of the rules.66  Knowledge of the
extent of precautions taken by the employer will lead to a more
accurate estimation of X.
The employer is also much more likely to have thorough
information about the arbitral forum than employees.  First, the
employer will know the basics about the forum itself:  what the
arbitration rules are, how the arbitrators are chosen, whether class
actions are allowed, whether punitive damages may be awarded, and
so on.  In fact, the employer may to a large extent craft these rules
itself.  Certainly, employers can choose an off-the-rack method of
arbitration, such as the rules and procedures of the American
Arbitration Association.67  But employers are choosing the process
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Psrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules$Procedures\National$International\..\..\focusArea\empl
oyment\000411aa.htm (setting forth rules developed for employers and employees seeking use
of private alternatives for dispute resolution).
68 As discussed below in Part III.A.5, the employer can also spread the costs of obtaining
this knowledge across all of its employee arbitration agreements, but employees must absorb
the costs individually.  See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
69 The advantages of the employer’s experiences with arbitration over time are often
referred to as the “repeat player effect.”  Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The
Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 190-91 (1997); Cole, supra note 9,
at 452-53.
70 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
and thereby will acquire significant information about it.  Employees
may or may not have access to the procedures when they sign the
arbitration agreement and may find it difficult and expensive to
obtain a real understanding of those procedures.  Certainly, an
employer may incur costs in choosing and setting up a method of
arbitration, and these costs should be included in the process.  But
in exchange for these costs, the employer will have a much better
sense of the effect of the forum on the probabilities of success, the
value of the relief, and the costs of the forum.68  Moreover, the
employer will gain further information about the process over time,
as it experiences actual arbitrations through the agreement.
Employees will likely only have exposure to arbitration once.69
Finally, if the employer knows that its costs will be lower in
arbitration and that its likelihood of success in arbitration will be no
less than in litigation, then the employer knows that an arbitration
agreement will always make economic sense.  Certainly, employees
would know the same:  They should sign if their costs are lower and
their chance of success is no less.  But employers should be able to
establish these conditions with much more certainty than could
employees.  As noted, employers can choose the rules and procedures
of the arbitral forum.70  Thus, employers will know whether those
procedures are no more generous to or biased toward the employee
than litigation procedures.  In fact, the employer can make sure that
arbitration procedures do not favor the employee.  Employees could
theoretically propose alternative rules and procedures to make sure
the arbitration procedures do not favor the employer, but the
employee is not likely to have enough information to propose a set
of alternative rules.  In order to develop alternate procedures, an
employee would likely need the costly services of an attorney.
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71 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 26, at 1078 (“Decision researchers have identified the
complexity of a decision as a leading cause of departures from the type of complete cost-benefit
analysis of decision options predicted by expected utility theory.”).
Moreover, an employer is likely to insist on its own rules, leaving the
employee to make the calculation as to whether this job offers more
utility than other potential jobs.  The end result is that the
employer’s proposed procedures will likely be the final ones, enabling
the employer to ensure at least that the arbitral process does not
favor the employee.
C. BEHAVIORAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE PREDISPUTE AGREEMENT
ANALYSIS
Given the complexity of these analyses, as well as the lack of
information about their underlying factors, it is virtually impossible
for employees to make an accurate valuation of the predispute
arbitration agreement.  In the face of this impossibility, employees
might react in different ways.  They might assign a high negative
value to the arbitration agreement and refuse to sign any such
agreement.  They might assign an agreement a minimal negative
value, or a positive value, and sign the agreement without further
thought.  Or employees might recognize that the agreement has
some value to the employer and negotiate for some benefit in
exchange for executing the agreement.
I know of no data, other than anecdotal, that suggests what
employees are actually doing.  However, there is psychological
research that suggests employees are likely to assign minimal
positive or negative values to such agreements.  The complexity of
the decision would probably drive employees to abandon any effort
to do a cost-benefit analysis.71  While employees may begin to work
through the costs and benefits of signing the arbitration agreement,
the difficulties in aggregating the factors, as well as the lack of
information about each factor, would lead an employee to stop short
of a complete analysis.  In the face of this frustration, employees
may resolve their dilemma through the use of decisionmaking
shortcuts, described in the cognitive psychology literature as
“heuristics.”  These heuristics, which have been studied and
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72 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology:  A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000).
73 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476 (1998). 
74 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 26, at 1078.
75 Given the savings in time and resources, these heuristics may be “rational” in the sense
that they ultimately are more efficient to the decisionmaker than traditional cost-benefit
analysis.  See POSNER, supra note 17, at 19.
developed since the 1970s, have recently received a fair amount of
attention in legal academia.  Heuristics form the basis for a new
approach to legal decisionmaking theory, known as “behavioral
decision theory”72 or “behavioral law and economics.”73  This
approach counsels that the rational actor thesis, found at the core of
law and economics, must be tempered based on known
“irrationalities” in human behavior.  These irrationalities, according
to some theorists, stem from an adaptive approach to complex or
difficult decisions.74  In order to resolve certain types of
decisionmaking quandaries, people will often adopt shortcuts, or
heuristics, that lead to nonrational decisions in certain types of
situations.75
The flashpoint we have been examining—the employee’s decision
to sign a predispute arbitration agreement—may be subject to
influence by several of the heuristics identified by researchers.
Given the complexities of the predispute agreement analysis, it is
not surprising that employees would resort to some form of
decisionmaking shortcut in deciding whether to sign.  Heuristics
that may have an effect on the process are described below.
1. Misconceptions and Probabilistic “Editing.”  In order to do a
complete expected utility calculation regarding potential
employment, the employee would have to calculate all of the
expected costs and benefits that the proffered job entails.  As noted
above, the predispute arbitration agreement is only one small factor
in the array of terms and conditions of employment.  The rational
employee would have to proceed step-by-step as to each factor in
making the rational utility calculus.
However, there is reason to believe that the employee may not
factor in the expected value of a predispute arbitration agreement.
To begin with, the employee may not even know that such an
agreement is required.  Employers are not likely to highlight the
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76 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:  A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 155 (1997)
(offering evidence that workers systematically overestimate legal protections against arbitrary
and unjust discharge); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law:  Exploring the Influences
on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 448 (1999) (concluding that workers
do not distinguish between informal norms and enforceable legal rights).
77 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 29 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000) (finding decisionmaking simplification involving discard of extremely unlikely outcomes).
78 Id. at 30.
79 See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment:  The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1801 (1996) (discussing people’s tendency to remove
improbable future risks from their calculations); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the
Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 243 (2001) (explaining that simplified decisional paths are
reason for dismissal of events unlikely to occur).
need for an agreement before employment begins.  In fact, such an
agreement may only be included in the paperwork that employees
fill out on their first day of work.  An employee might be able to
ascertain the existence of such an agreement beforehand, but the
employee would have to be aware of the existence of these
agreements.  Empirical studies have demonstrated that employees
often have misconceptions about the basic laws of the workplace—for
example, employees wrongly believe in the existence of just cause
termination protections.76  Although further research is necessary,
it is a fair hypothesis to assume that many workers will not even
know about arbitration agreements before one is presented to them.
Even if workers do know about arbitration agreements, they may
end up ignoring the agreement’s expected utility in making
calculations about the job at hand.  In developing their alternative
model of human decisionmaking known as “prospect theory,” Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky identified the tendency of subjects to
“edit out” unlikely outcomes from expected utility calculations.77
While this editing allows for simpler and quicker decisionmaking, it
also introduces potential irrationalities into the process.78
Commentators have noted the likelihood that workers will edit out
less salient factors from their decisionmaking process.79  This finding
reflects common sense:  It seems highly doubtful that employees
meticulously contemplate the value of all factors in the employment
decision, including predispute arbitration agreements.  But the
failure to factor in the arbitration agreement introduces a potential
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80 Employees’ ability to factor arbitration agreements into their cost-benefit
analysis—and, in fact, even their ability to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis—may be
affected by their cognitive abilities and their educational background.  See Gregory Mitchell,
Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87-98 (2002) (finding that education and
training may improve individual’s reasoning and increase adherence to prescriptive economic
principles).
81 This hypothetical resonates with commentators.  E.g., Grodin, supra note 10, at 3-6;
Victoria J. Craine, Note, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause:  Forum Selection or Employee
Coercion?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 537, 537 (1999).
82 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 77, at 20.  Kahneman and Tversky note that the
certainty effect was originally introduced by French economist Maurice Allais in 1953.  Id.
irrationality to the cost-benefit calculation.80  In effect, workers
would be assigning a value of zero to the arbitration agreement.
2. Certainty Bias.  Imagine yourself as an employee on your first
day of work at a new job.  A human resources administrator presents
you with, among other forms, a predispute arbitration agreement.
The administrator tells you that this agreement is company policy
and that you must sign it in order to be formally employed.  The pros
of signing the agreement are all immediate and certain:  You can
stay at the job, receive a paycheck, and continue with your plans for
success.  The cons are uncertain:  If, perchance, you are fired,
harassed, or otherwise injured in violation of the law, you will have
to take your claim to arbitration rather than court.  Moreover, your
alternatives are also uncertain:  You may be able to find a job that
does not require this form, but you would have to find and secure
that job at some future point.81  How will the costs and benefits of
signing this form (compared with the alternatives) be weighed in
your decision about the form?
According to expected utility theory, the costs and benefits of a
certain decision will be weighed according to the expected utility of
each of the costs and benefits of a particular decision, weighted
according to probability.  Thus, a 50% chance of receiving $100
should have the same expected utility as the certainty of receiving
$50.  However, a heuristic known as the “certainty effect” leads
individuals to place an irrationally high premium on certainty.82  In
experiments designed to examine the decisionmaking process,
Kahneman and Tversky found that people will value a certain
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83 Id.  For example, in Kahneman and Tversky’s study, subjects overwhelmingly chose a
100% chance of receiving $3,000 over an alternative option with an 80% chance of receiving
$4,000 and a 20% chance of receiving $0.  Id. at 21.
84 Some employees are asked to sign arbitration agreements after they have begun
working at the job.
85 It may be argued that in order to perform the proper cost-benefit analysis rational
employees would investigate whether the employer would require an arbitration agreement
before taking the job.  Although I know of no direct research on this point, my intuition would
be that most employees do not incorporate this issue into their initial cost-benefit analysis
about whether to take the job.  See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
86 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:  The Economic Case for
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1203-05 (1998) (discussing evidence
of immediacy bias).
87 George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME 57, 69
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).  Interestingly, the study found that people did
not prefer a $100 check payable in six years to a $200 check payable in eight years.  Id.  The
lack of immediacy likely cooled the irrational preference.
benefit more highly than they will value an uncertain benefit with
the same expected value.83
At the decisionmaking point for most employment arbitration
agreements, the job at hand is a certain prospect.  The employee has
already been chosen for employment, and the arbitration agreement
is just one of the formalities that must be executed at the beginning
of employment.84  The alternative to signing the agreement is
uncertain:  The employee must evaluate the chances of securing
another job with a higher expected utility.  Even though this job may
now have a lower expected utility once the arbitration agreement is
factored in, the employee will overvalue that utility given that the
utility is a certainty.85
Researchers have also found evidence that individuals prefer
activities that deliver immediate benefits over those that delay any
potential benefits.86  For example, researchers found that most
subjects preferred a check of $100 available immediately to a check
of $200 that could not be cashed for two years.87  In the case of
employment arbitration, an employee may have an economically
irrational bias toward the current job and its predispute agreement,
based on the strong psychic pull of the here and now.
3. Optimism Bias.  The term “optimism bias” refers not to an
overall sunny disposition, but rather to the general tendency of
individuals to underestimate the likelihood that something bad will
happen to them.  For example, even though applicants for a
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and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993),
cited in Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously:  The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 655 (1999).
89 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 tbl.1 (1980) (dividing number of optimistic responses
by number of pessimistic responses).
90 See id. (measuring mean comparative judgment of own chances versus chances of
others).
91 See Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in
Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1228-30 (2002) (discussing optimism bias and resulting underestimation
of risk).
92 See Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces:  A Rational Preference with
Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 14 n.66 (noting that availability heuristic causes people to extrapolate
information from what they happen to hear).
93 Id.
94 See Reilly, supra note 91, at 1230-34 (arguing heuristics lead to biases in judgment). 
95 SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121-22 (1993).
marriage license correctly estimated that the national divorce rate
was 50%, their modal estimation of their own chance of divorce was
zero.88  College students in another study were six times more likely
to respond that they expected their job satisfaction to be above the
average of their peers than below the average.89  Similarly,
respondents perceived themselves to be less likely than the average
to be unemployed.90  It is apparently human nature to expect oneself
to be less likely than others to suffer from misfortune or more likely
to experience success.  This optimism may extend to the employment
relationship:  The employee may place an unrealistically low
probability on the likelihood that some sort of employment law
dispute will arise.91
Optimism bias may be one component of a more complex set of
responses to uncertainty.  For example, another irrationality that
may come into play is the “availability heuristic,” which concerns the
effect of one’s pool of knowledge on probabilistic calculations.92  In
assessing the likelihood of certain events people are unduly
influenced by their own pool of personal information.93  They
overestimate the relevance of certain events or instances that are
“available” to their memories in ways that other events may not be.94
For example, most people incorrectly believe that homicides and car
accidents kill more Americans than diabetes and stomach cancer.95
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99 One might argue that the increasing publicity about employment disputes would make
such disputes “available” to employees.  However, as Sarah Rudolph Cole noted in 1996,
“Publicity about the use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes and the consequent
effects arbitration has on the resolution of discrimination claims is quite limited.”  Cole, supra
note 9, at 481.  Although arbitration has received more attention since 1996, it is hard to
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100 Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgements of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
1337, 1338-39 (1995); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 145-47 (1993).
101 Babcock et al., supra note 100, at 1340; Loewenstein et al., supra note 100, at 151-52.
102 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 26, at 1093.
Psychology researchers theorize that the basis of this misperception
is the “availability” to people’s memories, primarily through the
media, of instances of car accidents or murders.96  Instances of
diabetes or stomach cancer deaths receive less attention although
they are sadly far more common.97  In the case of events like divorce
and unemployment, individuals who have not experienced these
events may not have vivid stories “available” to their memories and
would underestimate the likelihood of such events.  If workers have
not experienced an employment dispute, either directly or through
the experience of someone they know, they may underestimate the
likelihood that such an experience would arise.98  Conversely, if
workers have such an experience in their information pool, they may
overestimate the likelihood of such an event recurring.99
The effects of the optimism or overconfidence bias seem to extend
beyond the scope of one’s experience.  Instead, this optimism seems
to play a strong role in shaping the perceptions of that experience.
For example, one study provided a group of law students with
factual information relating to a hypothetical lawsuit.100  Those
students assigned to be counsel for the plaintiffs interpreted the
facts as favorable to the plaintiff, while students assigned as defense
counsel interpreted the facts as favorable to the defendant.101  Thus,
even if employees were given information about the potential for
employment-related disputes, they might optimistically believe that
they would be able to avoid such disputes.  This tendency is what
researchers refer to as the “confirmatory” or “self-serving” bias.102  As
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with marriage and unemployment, people do not appear to enter a
job with the expectation that their employment law rights will be
violated.  It seems reasonable to predict that individuals will assign
a smaller probability to the chance of an employment dispute than
reality would require.103
4. Framing Effects.  Numerous studies have shown that the way
choices are framed has an effect on how individuals make those
choices.  This notion may seem like common sense, but framing
effects can work in strange and irrational ways.  For example,
studies of employee investment behavior show that employees will
alter their investment strategies based on the choices in front of
them.  One such study offered employees the choice between a stock
fund and a bond fund with different rates of return.104  One group of
employees was shown the one-year rates of return while another
group was shown a simulated distribution of the thirty-year rates of
returns for the funds.105  Employees shown the one-year rate
invested a majority of their money in the bond fund while those
shown the thirty-year rates chose to invest almost everything in the
stock fund.106
All of this is to suggest that our decisionmaking processes are
susceptible to influence.  We may place undue importance on the
facts as presented to us or as highlighted in a set of materials.  In
providing the arbitration agreement for the employee to execute, the
employer chooses how to frame the decision.  The employer could tell
the employee that the arbitration program offers a chance for
employees to save money on legal bills.  Or the employer could
present the agreement as a mere formality, a part of the set of forms
that all employees sign on their first day.  An agreement to arbitrate
might be part of an employee handbook, or the agreement may not
even be given to the employee.  Certainly, more research is
necessary to determine what kinds of framing employers may
engage in and whether these framing devices have any effects.  But
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it certainly would not be surprising to find that employees have
different types of reactions to different methods of presenting the
arbitration agreement.  Such framing effects add another level of
irrationality to the cost-benefit analysis.
D. THE ADVANTAGES OF DEFERRING ARBITRATION DECISIONS
Before discussing the conclusions we can draw from the models
discussed earlier, a brief summary may be in order.  When
considering arbitration after a dispute has arisen, the employee and
employer will agree to submit that dispute to arbitration if the
expected value of arbitration is greater than the expected value of
litigation.  Expressed as an equation, each party would choose
arbitration if:
Pa * Ra – Ca > Pl * Rl – Cl.
If the parties differ as to their preferred forum, one party will pay
the other party to ensure that they both agree to the most efficient
forum.  Certainly, there is no guarantee that the parties will have
the perfect information necessary to ensure an efficient result.  But
the types of information required—probability of success, potential
for relief, and estimated costs—are data that parties and
professional players attempt to estimate all the time.
When considering arbitration before a dispute has arisen, the
parties must make a different determination.  The predispute
decision is far more complex, particularly for the employee.  The
employee must calculate what the potential costs and benefits would
be for all potential situations involving prohibited activities.  Then
the employee must estimate the probabilities that these situations
would arise.  As noted above, the expression of this decision would
be:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a –
C(n)a)],
as compared with
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[Xl(1) * (P(1)l * R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l * R(n)l – C(n)l)].
If the agreement is required by the employer, the employee would
have to factor in this agreement when comparing the current job
with all other potential jobs.  Again, such a decision could be
expressed as:
Jj1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a * R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a * R(n)a –
C(n)a)],
as compared with
(Pj2 * ( Jj2 + "j2)) + (Dj3 * (Jj3+ "j3)) + . . . + (Djn * (Jjn+ "jn)).
The information needed for these calculations is far more difficult to
obtain than the information needed for the simple (P * R) – C.  And
in all likelihood, the employee will find it economically inefficient to
consult an attorney or other expert since the costs of obtaining the
information will likely be greater than the benefits, and the
agreement may well be a condition of employment.  Given the
impossible task of making an economically rational decision about
such an agreement, employees are prone to use decisionmaking
shortcuts to make up their mind—shortcuts that may lead to
systematically irrational results.
What does this analysis tell us about these agreements?  In my
view, it tells us that postdispute agreements to arbitrate are much
more likely to be based on good information and therefore much
more likely to be not only efficient, but also optimal for both sides.
Predispute agreements, on the other hand, are more likely to be
based on primitive guesswork, or less, on the part of the
employee—the worse the information, the greater the chance that
the agreements will not be efficient.  In addition, the employer is
likely to have a significant informational advantage over the
employee.  Employers may use this advantage to construct
inefficient agreements that employees would not agree to if they had
perfect information.107
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needed to decide efficiently about predispute agreements.  Hylton believes that employees are
making a “rational bet” that they will be better off as a result of the agreement and that the
parties should be left to abide by the results of their bet.  Hylton, supra note 17, at 251.
Hylton also argues that employees may be exhibiting “rational apathy” in not attending to the
details of the agreement on the grounds that the expected costs of investigation may be too
high for the potential benefits gained.  See id. at 252.  The costs for an individual employee,
however, might be high enough that the employee takes a real utility hit, rather than a de
minimis loss.  In such cases, the employer can take advantage of the economy of scale to
extract rents from employees unwilling to challenge the employer’s position.  See Cole, supra
note 9, at 475-76 (discussing advantages to employer in developing standardized employee
agreements).  Hylton also argues that competition among employers for employees will drive
unfair arbitration agreements out of the market.  Hylton, supra note 17, at 252-53.  If
employees do not accurately price those agreements, however, they will not realize the value
of such agreements.  Thus, an employer who offered a fair agreement would be punished by
the market, as employees would undervalue such agreements.  Finally, Hylton argues that
even if employees can be taken advantage of in the short term, they will eventually realize this
and demand less biased agreements (or no agreements) in the future.  Id. at 253-54.  I would
agree that, over time, employees will become more aware of the pros and cons of such
agreements.  Their psychological “availability” will increase, particularly if the media
highlights egregious examples of such predispute agreements.  Employees may even band
together to get more information about such agreements.  But in my estimation the time of
such awareness has not arrived.
108 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 251 (“It is common in contract settings for one party to
know more than the other about some aspect of the deal, and so for the uninformed party to
make a statistical bet that he is better off entering the contract despite his informational
deficit.”).
Of course, there is no general legal requirement that contracts be
efficient, nor must parties have good information about the
substance of an agreement in order for that agreement to be
enforceable.  People make contracts all the time involving risk—risk
that may be very difficult to calculate.  When a member of the public
purchases a share of a company’s stock, for example, that person
may have no idea what the real value of that stock should be.  Other
players in the market may have access to sophisticated analyses
about the company’s management, the industry’s prospects, and the
economy’s direction.  But this person might have purchased the
stock because they liked the company’s logo.  Similarly, people can
buy insurance for events about which they know little in terms of
probability.  Homeowners’ insurance is just one example—how likely
are such events as theft, fire, flood, or hurricane?  How much should
insurance against these events cost?  People make ill-informed
decisions about risk all the time.  Why should we care in this case?108
First, I think we generally do care about situations where one
party is consistently likely to have an informational advantage over
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109 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2000).
110 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
111 See, e.g., website for John W. Oxendine, Georgia Insurance and Safety Fire
Commissioner, at http://www.inscomm.state.ga.us/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) (linking to
information regarding insurance regulation).
112 See, e.g., Missouri Lottery, Understanding Powerball Chances, at http://www.
molottery.com/aboutourgames/howtowin/numbergames/powerball/powerball$understandin
godds.shtm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004) (explaining odds of winning Missouri powerball lottery).
113 See supra note 17 (defining Pareto efficiency).
114 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 12 (“Who can quarrel with unanimity as a criterion of
social choice?”).
115 Id. at 13.
116 Of course, some theories of contract law place no reliance on the notion of Pareto
another party.  While a person need not conduct a thorough analysis
of a company’s prospectus before buying its stock, federal securities
regulation ensures that a vast supply of information is available for
those who wish to make use of it.109  Moreover, those with special
insider information are prohibited from trading.110  Insurance
companies are heavily regulated by state commissions, in part due
to the informational disadvantage of consumers.111  Even state
lotteries tell buyers that they only have a 1-in-120-million chance of
winning the Powerball jackpot.112  When there are possible
information discrepancies, the law often steps in to ameliorate such
discrepancies or their effects.
Second, one of the primary ideological bases for contract law is
the notion of Pareto optimality.  Two parties will only agree to a
contract if they both expect to be better off from it.113  Certainly,
after the contract has been fully performed, one side may find itself
worse off than it expected to be.  But economically rational parties
will not execute a contract unless they expect the contract to
increase their utility.  This expectation—that everyone will be better
off if this exchange occurs—forms the cornerstone of economic
thinking and also provides the normative foundation for economic
theory.  While the wealth-maximization norm in economics has its
fair share of critics, the norm of Pareto optimality is much less
controversial.114  Its relative scarcity in the real world of
policymaking makes it even more attractive when it does surface.115
Thus, if parties are not making rational calculations that a certain
agreement will make them better off, the normative justifications for
contract law are weakened.116
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optimality.  See Barnett, supra note 20, at 271-91 (discussing different theoretical justifications
for contract).
117 See Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (discussing
why individuals may not be permitted to waive rights provided by society through Title VII).
118 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
Title VII . . . concerns . . . an individual’s right to equal employment
opportunities.  Title VII’s strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory
practices.  Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.  In these
circumstances, an employee’s rights under Title VII are not susceptible of
prospective waiver.
Id.
119 Id. at 51.
120 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (finding arbitration
agreements enforceable under FAA does not contravene federal law protecting against
discrimination); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991) (finding
no inconsistency between policies of Age Discrimination in Employment Act and agreements
to arbitrate age discrimination claims).
121 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 230 (“If the arbitral forum is heavily biased in favor of the
defendant, then an arbitration agreement may be effectively equivalent to a waiver.”).
Third, employment laws provide state-mandated rights to
employees.  These laws represent a public decision to compensate
individuals for certain types of injuries.  If employees are signing
away important procedural protections for those rights, society has
more of an interest than if employees are merely agreeing to lower
wages.117  The Supreme Court has found predispute waivers of
employment law rights to be unenforceable because such rights are
deemed to represent a societal entitlement.118  The remedial benefits
offered by these statutes, along with the deterrence effects of such
remedies, are deemed to be part of a “congressional command that
each employee be free from discriminatory practices.”119  The
Supreme Court has premised its approval of predispute arbitration
agreements on the notion that such agreements are not waivers of
the underlying substantive rights.120  However, a biased predispute
agreement to arbitrate effectively acts as a waiver.121  Even a slightly
biased agreement weakens the effects of the statutory entitlements.
Thus, to the extent employees are taking a risk by using incomplete
information, they are gambling with their congressional
entitlements.
Finally, one has to ask, what is the point of the predispute
agreement?  What is the “risk” that the agreement is allocating?
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122 As one advocate puts it, “[i]f proponents of arbitration are correct in their belief that it
is faster, cheaper[,] and better than the judicial system, then surely employees and their
attorneys will opt for arbitration in a voluntary system.”  Patricia Ireland, President of
National Organization of Women, Address before a committee of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (June 1997), at http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html.
After all, an employee can agree to arbitrate a dispute after it arises.
Why constrain that choice beforehand?122  When other contracts are
made based on poor information, the contract is often intended to
hedge the risk inherent in the situation.  People buy stocks, for
example, to provide capital to a risky enterprise.  The company
receives funds it could not otherwise acquire (due to the risk), and
the stock buyer receives the opportunity to participate in the
company’s profits.  The buyer knows that she has imperfect
information, but that risk is part of the reason for the deal.
Similarly, insurance contracts are a straightforward hedge against
risk; a homeowner buys flood insurance to mitigate the financial
harms of a potential flood.  But why would parties sign a predispute
arbitration agreement?  Are the parties hedging a risk?  If so, a risk
of what?  Initially, the predispute agreement is only a “hedge”
against litigation; it prevents the possibility that the parties will not
agree to arbitrate the dispute later.  But both parties will clearly
have better information about the costs and benefits of arbitration
after the dispute arises.  Why not wait until then to decide?  Why
constrain choice?
III.  POTENTIAL THEORIES FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF PREDISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The following section is an effort to answer these questions by
explaining why predispute arbitration agreements may provide
greater efficiency under certain conditions than postdispute
agreements.  It is not enough that the predispute agreements lead
to generally efficient results if those same results could have been
achieved through a postdispute agreement.  As an example, let us
suppose a world where arbitration costs are always less than
litigation and arbitration results are always as equally fair as
litigation results.  In such a world, it would be efficient for both
parties to sign a predispute arbitration agreement.  But rational
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123 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 17, at 5 (“[W]hile reduction in costs is an advantage of ex
ante [Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)] agreements, it is equally an advantage of ex post
ADR agreements.”).
124 See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two:  Why Postdispute Voluntary Arbitration
Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 37 (2003) (“In order for a postdispute voluntary
arbitration system to work, both the plaintiff’s and the defense lawyer need to conclude that
arbitration’s benefits outweigh its costs and that arbitration represents the best chance for
success for each lawyer.”) (emphasis omitted).
parties would also always agree to arbitrate their dispute after the
dispute arose; there would be no benefit to parties for signing a
predispute agreement.123
Therefore, in order for predispute agreements to serve some
efficiency purpose, they must force some parties into arbitration
when they would not have chosen to do so postdispute.  Moreover,
the agreement must force such parties into a more efficient outcome
than they would have reached without the agreement.  The following
are efforts to describe such conditions, grouped in the categories of
(A) ex ante benefits, (B) prevention of irrational arbitration rejection,
and (C) the reduction of societal externalities.
A. EX ANTE BENEFITS
It is perhaps difficult to imagine a scenario that fits our two
criteria for predispute agreement efficiency:  (1) it would be more
efficient for the parties to choose arbitration over litigation to resolve
a particular dispute, but (2) at least one of the parties would not
choose arbitration without the presence of an arbitration agreement.
The Coase Theorem teaches that if arbitration is the more efficient
outcome, the parties will bargain and will end up choosing
arbitration.  Even though one party might have a preference for
litigation at the outset of negotiations, the parties would ultimately
decide to choose arbitration if arbitration is more efficient.  Thus, the
Coase Theorem would seem to rebut claims that postdispute
agreements will never take place because one side or the other will
always prefer litigation after the dispute has arisen.124  Even if
litigation always offers an advantage for one side, the parties will
negotiate around the litigation default option if it is more efficient
to proceed to arbitration.
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The following five possibilities, however, describe how predispute
agreements might offer ex ante benefits by constraining the parties
from choosing litigation after the dispute has arisen.  In other words,
the predispute agreement provides greater efficiency by forcing the
parties into an arbitration that is socially efficient but would not be
chosen after the dispute arose.  In each case, although one of the
parties would have a postdispute preference for litigation that could
be overcome through negotiation, the overall good is better served by
preventing that party from litigating.
1. Spreading the Benefits.  If arbitration provides more efficiency
as between the parties than litigation, the parties will bargain to go
to arbitration.  In a postdispute scenario, the employer and employee
would negotiate to split the benefits that accrue from choosing
arbitration over litigation.  The employee and employer might have
equally lower litigation costs and thus would not exchange any
payment as part of the deal.  In other cases, the employer might
have significantly greater savings from arbitration than would the
employee.  In negotiating over the potential forum, each party could
bargain to obtain some of the surplus.  For example, assume that an
employee is threatening to bring a suit against an employer.  The
employee’s costs would be the same in both arbitration and
litigation, but the suit would cost an employer an estimated $10,000
to litigate but only $1,000 to arbitrate.  The employee would
negotiate with the employer to arbitrate the dispute in exchange for
receiving some of the $9,000 in savings.
If we assume a world in which arbitration always saves an
employer significant costs as compared to litigation fees, then a
predispute arbitration agreement would save an employer
significant sums.  What happens to that money?  The employer gets
it, but theoretically employees could bargain for that surplus as well.
In the predispute world, however, the money cannot be allocated
only to those employees who will eventually bring a claim against
the employer.  Instead, employees have to bargain individually for
what they believe is their share of the employer’s surplus.  If each
employee is a potential claimant, then each employee will deserve a
share of the surplus.  As an example, C&C Co. has ten employees.
Based on the past history of C&C Co., as well as societal trends, the
employees and the employer would predict that two of these ten
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125 See supra notes 25-70 and accompanying text.
employees will bring claims against the employer during the course
of their career.  These claims would each cost the employer $10,000
to litigate but $1,000 to arbitrate.  If all employees choose to sign a
predispute agreement, the employer will save $18,000.  Each of the
ten employees could therefore negotiate to receive some part of this
surplus.  Their pro rata share of the surplus, however, would only be
$1,800.  Thus, if the employer distributed all of its surplus equally
to the employees, each employee would receive $1,800 for signing the
predispute agreement.  However, if employees did not sign such
agreements, two of the employees would be able to negotiate a
$9,000 payment when they brought their claims, while the other
employees would receive nothing.
In this example, the predispute agreement serves as a form of
reverse litigation insurance.  If you think of litigation as a windfall,
and if employees are risk averse, a risk-averse employee might
choose a 100% chance of receiving $1,800 to a 20% chance of
receiving $9,000.  Thus, a predispute agreement might provide
better overall utility.  Certainly, an employee would have no
incentive to voluntarily share his or her settlement with the other
employees after a dispute has arisen.  By locking in employees ahead
of time, the predispute agreement insures that the efficiency gains
are spread to all employees, not just those who choose to litigate.
There are several problems with this model.  First, the model
assumes that the employer passes on all of the cost savings to the
employees.  Employees, however, are in a much better position to
extract this surplus after the dispute has already arisen.  As
discussed in Part II, it is much harder to calculate the cost savings
for a predispute agreement than it is for a postdispute agreement.125
The employer and employee will know substantially more about the
nature of the claim, and therefore the potential costs, when the
claim is on the table.  Moreover, individual employees lack the
information to know exactly what costs savings a predispute
agreement will create.  As noted above, the informational difficulties
may lead employees to ignore or guess about the factors that would
go into a proper cost-benefit analysis of the agreement.
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126 See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer:  Empirical and Other Approaches to the
Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 750 (2001) (noting that
if only source of savings from arbitration is lower awards, “then the Gilmer rule undoes, to
some extent, the effects of the employment discrimination statute”).
A second and more disturbing problem is that this “reverse”
insurance would act to draw money away from those who are injured
and give it to the rest of the employee class.  If an employment claim
really were like the lottery, this development might not raise
concerns.  An employment claim, however, stems from an injury
inflicted in violation of a legal mandate.  Taking money away from
the injured to spread amongst the noninjured seems a perverse
method of societal distribution.  In addition, those in the injured
class, at least for employment discrimination claims, are more likely
to be members of a protected class:  racial or ethnic minorities,
women, the elderly, or the disabled.  Certainly, the policies
underlying the civil rights acts would be undermined by agreements
that took money from injured victims of these groups and distributed
it to all employees.
Finally, we have assumed that all of the arbitration “surplus” for
the employer comes from a savings in the costs of litigation.  If some
of the surplus comes from a savings in the amount of relief rendered,
then the victims are actually paying for the surplus out of their
entitlement.126  As another example, let us assume DDD, Inc. will
save an expected $10,000 if a case is taken to arbitration, not in
costs saved but in a reduction in the expected award.  The expected
award from litigation is $30,000, and the expected award from
arbitration is $20,000.  This may be due to the bias of the arbitrator,
an arbitral limit on certain types of damages, or other factors.
Regardless, if an employee knows about this difference, he or she
may negotiate with DDD, Inc. to receive the difference in exchange
for taking the case to arbitration.  After all, the employee is entitled
to the expected $30,000 benefit under law.  Under a predispute
arbitration agreement, however, the employee would not be able to
bargain for this surplus after the fact; instead, it would accrue
entirely to DDD, Inc.  Employees might be able to negotiate for the
expected “bias” differential ahead of time.  The differential, however,
would accrue to all employees, rather than exclusively to those who
are injured.  Injured employees would get only a fraction of the
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127 Estreicher, supra note 33, at 559. 
128 Id. at 563.
129 Id.  See also Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory
Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1357 (1997) (“In short, we have a system in
which a few individuals in protected classes win a lottery of sorts, while others queue up in the
administrative agencies and face reduced employment opportunities.”).
$10,000 bias differential.  This result would obviously undermine the
remedial purposes of the employment law protections.
Given these objections, the “spreading-the-benefits” theory fails
to provide sufficient efficiency justifications for predispute
agreements.
2. Trading a Few Big Claims for Many Small Ones.  A more
promising justification finds its most prominent proponent in
Samuel Estreicher and his “Saturns for Rickshaws” theory.127
According to Estreicher, litigation is not a usable entitlement for
many employees.128  For those employees with low wages, less severe
employment law injuries, or less certain litigation outcomes, the
costs of litigation may be too high to bring suit.  Most employees
cannot pay attorneys enough to take the suit for a preset fee, and the
potential contingency fees are too small for these claims.  Other
employees, however, have higher salaries and suffer injuries that
may entitle them to compensatory or punitive damages.  These
employees also benefit from an unpredictable jury system, which
could provide a range of damages extending up to sizeable sums.
They can readily find attorneys and can often secure large
settlements with the threat of litigation.  Thus, Estreicher paints a
picture of two sets of employees:  those with “rickshaws”—claims too
small to be litigated—and those with “Cadillacs”—suits which entitle
them to significant awards.129
As part of his efficiency argument, Estreicher raises the
possibility that in some cases an employer might game the system
to prevent a claim from going to arbitration, even where it might be
efficient to do so.  As an example, let us suppose that an employer
violates an employee’s employment law rights, and as a result the
employee suffers an injury of $1,000.  The costs of litigating the
dispute are $1,000, and the employee would have an 80% chance of
success.  The costs of arbitrating the dispute would be $200, and the
employee would have a 75% chance of success.  A cost-benefit
50 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
130 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
131 “Saturn” refers to cars produced by the Saturn Corporation, a division of General
Motors that specializes in mid-priced, consumer-friendly cars.  See Saturn Corp., Important
Date In Saturn History 1, at www.saturn.com/aboutus2/student/pdf/Full$Student$Packet.pdf
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004) (describing formation and concept of Saturn Corporation).  I must
admit that as a former and satisfied owner of a Saturn, I find this metaphor particularly
effective.  However, Saturns have recently received poor marks from the trade press.  Jerry
Flint, The Rings Fall Off Saturn, Forbes.com (Jan. 1, 2003), available at http//www.forbes.
com/home$europe/2003/01/01/cz$jf$0101flint.html.
analysis reveals that the litigation computation reaches a negative
result for the employee:  (.80 * $1,000) – $1,000 = -$200.  The
arbitration result is much better:  (.75 * $1,000) – $200 = $550.  If we
assume that the employer has exactly the same costs, the employer
would also prefer arbitration to litigation.  The expected value of
litigation would be (.80 * -$1,000) – $1,000 = -$1,800, while the
expected value of arbitration would be (.75 * -$1,000) – $200 = -$950.
However, if (assuming perfect information) the employer knows that
the employee would lose money by bringing the suit, the employer
will not agree to arbitration.130  Even though it is more efficient for
both parties to pursue arbitration, the employee will be unable to
sufficiently compensate the employer for choosing arbitration, and
the employer will sit tight and wait for the employee to go away.
This result of no litigation or arbitration—and a “de facto” award of
$0—is obviously the best result for the employer.  It is also
preferable for the employee, compared against litigation’s $200 loss.
And the employee cannot force the employer into arbitration.
Assuming this situation, it is preferable for the employee to sign
a predispute arbitration agreement.  In such a case, the employer is
locked into arbitration and therefore could not reject the option later.
Of course, if litigation costs were a barrier to every employment
claim, the employer could sit tight on every claim and therefore
would never agree to a predispute agreement.  Thus, the tradeoff
that makes the predispute agreement palatable to the employer is
lower exposure on the claims that could go to litigation.  Thus, the
employer will have to save costs on litigable claims—potentially
through lower awards—in order to balance out the increase in costs
for nonlitigable claims.  To use Estreicher’s metaphor, if some
workers are to get the chance to trade their rickshaws for Saturns,131
others will have to trade in their Cadillacs.
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Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview$charge$filing.html (last visited Sept.
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Estreicher’s argument is really a form of “reverse insurance” in
that it takes from the few (with big claims) and gives to the many
(with small claims).132  It even has a Robin Hood quality to it since
the “few” in his discussion are generally well-paid employees and the
“many” are lower-paid employees.  As a whole, employees may wish
to exchange the possibility of a high litigation award for a better shot
at compensation for their smaller grievances.
However, I have several concerns with Estreicher’s theory.  First,
Estreicher assumes that employees with small claims will not
engage in any strategic decisionmaking in order to get compensation.
Turning back to our example, the employer rejects postdispute
arbitration because it knows litigation has a negative net return for
the employee (-$200).  Thus, the employer assumes the employee
will not pursue her claim.  The employee, however, would know that
litigation also has a negative net return for the employer—a much
more significant one (-$1,800).  Might an employee then decide to
play a game of litigation “chicken”?  In other words, the employee
would go forward with the claim, even though it is a losing
proposition, because she would expect the employer to blink first and
offer a settlement or agree to arbitration.  It might be a risky
strategy, since it might end up with a $200 loss, but the employee
would know it was in the employer’s best interest to settle.  Even if
the employer paid only $201, the employee would be better off by $1
and the employer would be better off by $1,599.  Estreicher might
argue that employees with small claims could not even get their
claims filed, since plaintiffs’ attorneys would not be willing to sign
on to this strategy.  Employees, however, can file discrimination-
related charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) for free.133  As other commentators have
pointed out, employers may be willing to settle even baseless claims
in order to avoid the costs of an EEOC investigation and potential
lawsuit.134
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135 The choice of “Cadillac” has particular rhetorical effects.  It symbolizes flashy,
conspicuous consumption.  In his well-known description of welfare fraud, former president
Ronald Reagan described a “welfare queen” who drove to pick up her checks in a Cadillac.
DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN 64-65 (1997).
 Second, in order for Estreicher’s model to make economic sense
for employees, there has to be some set of cases that would net the
employee a positive return in arbitration but a negative return in
litigation.  But if even meritless suits have value in the current
system, then how many claims fit this category?  In other words, for
how many claims is there a smaller net benefit to pursuing a
strategy of settlement and litigation rather than just dropping the
suit entirely?  This question is largely an empirical one, and it
depends on the cost differences between arbitration and litigation in
employment cases, and the distribution of values for the various
employment law claims.  Estreicher’s hypothesis—that a number of
low-value claims are being stymied—may be correct, but there is
insufficient data to know what this number might be.  If the number
is small, then employees might end up trading in more Cadillacs
than rickshaws.
Third, Estreicher’s clever metaphor for his system masks part of
the underlying dynamic.  By labeling high-value claims as
“Cadillacs,” and low-value claims as “rickshaws,” Estreicher makes
his new system of “Saturns” seem more egalitarian.  But why do
some claimants have high-value claims and others have low-value
claims?  One reason may be their incomes:  Those with higher
salaries will have greater damages for lost wages and future
compensation.  But another reason may be the severity of their
claim.  An employee who is fired, for example, will generally have a
more significant injury, and therefore a greater damages claim, than
an employee in the same position who was not promoted.  An
employee who suffered continual and degrading sexual harassment
may be entitled to substantial compensatory and punitive damages.
These employees have higher claims for a reason:  Their injuries are
worse.  Thus, an employee is not necessarily driving a “Cadillac”
because she has a cushy job; she may have just sustained grievous
damages.135  This system begins to look like the “spreading the
benefits” solution; it takes a chunk from those with significant
claims and spreads it around to those with small or no claims.
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predispute arbitration could be constructed to encourage more employment-related suits by
subsidizing the costs of bringing an action.  Shavell, supra note 17, at 7.  Shavell posits a
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suit are extremely high—higher, in fact, than the expected return of the suit.  Id.  Thus, the
precautionary measures would not be taken since suits would be too costly to bring.  Id. at 7
n.10.  A process that allowed the buyers to bring a suit inexpensively would encourage the
seller to make the inexpensive precautions.  As Shavell admits, such an ADR system would
effectively have to “encourage[ ] suit (for example, by subsidizing it).”  Id. at 7.  Employees and
employers could create an arbitration agreement that provides cheaper costs for employees
Finally, Estreicher’s description of arbitration results seems to
assume that all workers would be covered by the system of
predispute arbitration agreements.  Estreicher notes that employers
do not know ahead of time who will be claimants and, therefore,
should want to include all employees in the agreement.136  However,
if Estreicher is correct in assuming that well-paid employees are the
ones with the high-value claims, the employer will have an incentive
to get highly paid employees into arbitration and leave poorly paid
employees out.  The employer has no obligation to offer the
predispute agreement to all employees.  So why would the employer
not just offer the predispute agreement to those employees likely to
have “Cadillacs”?  Indeed, one would expect different employers to
have different incentives.  Employers with a highly paid, white collar
workforce would have the incentive to adopt a predispute agreement,
while those with a lower paid, less legally aware workforce would
not.  If this happens, we would be trading a Cadillac-and-rickshaw
system for a Saturn-and-rickshaw system.
Ultimately, I think that Estreicher’s ideas would find their best
fulfillment in a system of court-supervised arbitration or even labor
courts.  Such a system would be mandatory and thus would not
allow for the opt-out possibilities described above.  It would have a
uniform set of required procedures, which would eliminate employer
opportunism in the design of the system.  At the same time, it would
utilize many aspects of arbitration that Estreicher finds so
attractive:  lower costs, quicker decisions, and better access for
poorer claimants.  Such system may eventually be created.  In the
meantime, it is difficult to say whether private arbitration
agreements have implemented Estreicher’s “Saturns for rickshaws”
vision.137
54 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
and higher penalties against employers.  As I argue above, however, employees lack the
information necessary to craft such an agreement, and employers have no incentive to create
such an agreement. 
138 Hylton, supra note 17, at 218.
139 Id. at 220-22.
140 Shavell, supra note 17, at 7.
It could be that, given the applicable law, too many actions would be
brought in the sense that they would absorb resources in the form of
dispute resolution costs but not produce any (or, more generally, much)
benefit in behavior.  In such a case, the two sides would elect to make an
ADR agreement that reduces the frequency of disputes.
Id.
141 Hylton, supra note 17, at 230.
142 Id.
143 Id.
3. Eliminating or Reducing Precautionary Costs.  Another
potential for ex ante efficiency gains would come from the reduction
of precautionary measures that an employer might take to prevent
employment law violations.  As discussed earlier, Keith Hylton has
explained how the potential for litigation may induce employers to
make efforts to prevent such claims from arising in the first place.138
Such efforts involve costs.  If these precautionary efforts are
sufficiently expensive, and litigation is expensive for both the
employer and employee, an employer may wish to “buy out” an
employee’s employment law rights ahead of time.  In this way, the
employer can refrain from taking precautions and not worry about
litigation.  The employee is satisfied because she receives more in
expected value than she would receive by keeping the potential
causes of action.139  Steven Shavell has made a similar point.140
Essentially, Hylton’s argument for predispute agreements is the
same as his argument for predispute waivers: Parties may decide
that it is more efficient to agree ahead of time to bar or water down
claims rather than allow claims to be litigated once they arise.141  As
Hylton points out, a biased arbitration agreement may serve the
same ends as a waiver—in both cases, the plaintiff is effectively
barred from pursuing compensation for her claim.142  But Hylton
does not share the same aversion to waivers as the Supreme Court.
Instead, Hylton believes that waiver agreements can enhance the
joint wealth of the parties; therefore, parties should be permitted to
waive their rights.143  As he notes:  “The existence of a biased
arbitral forum, rather than being a sign of contract failure, may be
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146 Hylton, supra note 17, at 226.
147 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
148 United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also POSNER,
supra note 17, at 168 (citing Judge Hand’s negligence formula).
evidence that the parties would have chosen to enter into a waiver
agreement had that option been legally available.”144
Certainly, it is theoretically possible for two parties with perfect
information to reach efficient agreements to waive their prospective
disputes or subject their disputes to an arbitral forum.  As discussed
in Part II, however, I have substantial doubts that employees ever
have the kind of information they would need to make such
agreements.145  Hylton notes that he makes “rather heroic
assumptions” regarding “the parties’ abilities to foresee events and
to calculate the costs and benefits of various decisions.”146  However,
Hylton has greater faith in the parties’ ultimate ability to get the
information they need for these decisions.  I discussed these
differences at greater length in Part II.147
I also question another of Hylton’s assumptions:  that employers
could eliminate significant precautionary costs if allowed to waive or
water down employment law claims through arbitration.  The notion
of precautionary costs is familiar from the realm of negligence,
where Learned Hand’s famous B < PL formula dictates that
negligence only occurs when the potential for damage exceeds the
costs of precautions.148  If the burden of precautionary costs is
greater than the damage those costs are designed to prevent, then
it is inefficient to take such precautions, even if injuries result.
Negligence, however, is essentially the law of accidents:  The injurer
has no intention to injure the victim.  Employment law, on the other
hand, generally concerns intentional acts:  discrimination,
harassment, or failure to meet some minimum standard of pay or
workplace safety.  What exactly would the “precautions” be in the
employment law context?  Perhaps employee monitoring, workplace
training, and human resource personnel could be considered such
costs.  But these are all efforts to eliminate or mitigate intentional
acts.  Society understands that a certain level of manufacturing
imperfections is inevitable and even necessary (at least in the short
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149 See Hylton, supra note 17, at 250-54 (noting that information asymmetry is not
substantial problem).
150 Cf. Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 2273, 2274 (2003) (describing author’s “extremely strong taste for not being
discriminated against”).
151 Shavell, supra note 17, at 5-6.
152 Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration:  An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 551-61 (2003).
153 See Shavell, supra note 17, at 5-6 (arguing that alternative dispute resolution may
cause changes in parties’ behavior that increases value of their contractual relationship).
Shavell uses the example of two parties contracting for the sale of some good or service.  Id.
at 6.  The value of good performance to the buyer is $1,000, while the value of substandard
performance is $500.  Id.  Full performance will cost the seller $400, but substandard
performance will cost $300, saving him $100.  Id.  In this example, both parties are better off
if substandard performance can be discouraged, but the seller will engage in substandard
run), but we would prefer a world entirely without racial or age
discrimination.  Sexual harassment is not an inevitable side effect
of productive enterprise.
Ultimately, my main concern with Hylton’s argument is his belief
that the information difficulties can be overcome.149  Even if such
difficulties could be overcome, however, I question whether Hylton’s
precautionary costs would ever be so significant as to warrant a
waiver or a biased arbitration agreement, especially given society’s
distaste for discrimination.150
4. Stronger Deterrence Through More Accurate Adjudication.  The
flip side of Hylton’s “reduction of precautionary costs” argument is
that arbitration could actually heighten precautionary costs by
adjudicating certain claims more effectively.  Under this scenario,
discussed by Shavell151 as well as Drahozal and Hylton,152 a
predispute arbitration agreement will be efficient if (a) there is a
potential for breach of contract which will save one party money but
make the other party worse off; (b) courts are unable to detect or
punish such breaches properly, while arbitrators can do so more
effectively; and therefore, (c) without an arbitration agreement, the
receiving party will only pay the value of contract as breached (if at
all), while with an arbitration agreement, the party will be willing
to pay for the value of full performance.  Under this scenario, the
parties will act more efficiently if they are able to enforce a
predispute arbitration clause.  Essentially, the argument is this:  If
parties can create a system that will better enforce their contractual
obligations, then it is efficient to allow them to do so.153
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production if the chance of getting caught is low.  Id.  If arbitrators are much better at
detecting substandard performance than courts, then both sides would be better off if they
agreed to arbitration at the onset of the agreement.  Id.  The seller would not agree to
postdispute arbitration, since at that point he or she wants to avoid detection.  Id.
154 We may assume that the courts do a poor job of uncovering harassment, but the
assumptions do not really change if we assume that courts just have a restrictive definition
of harassment.
155 See Shavell, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing how alternative dispute resolution may
induce beneficial behavior).
In theory, such a situation could arise in the employment context.
For example, we would have to assume that X Co. could prevent
employee harassment relatively cheaply, but it has no incentive to
do so because courts have consistently declined to find X Co. guilty
of harassment.154  X Co., however, realizes that employees hate
harassment and will be more productive on the job if they are not
subjected to it.  Thus, X Co. agrees to set up a generous arbitration
agreement with savvy arbitrators who will be able to root out
harassment.  This system will compel the company to take the
precautions necessary to prevent the harassment in the first place.
The hypothetical above displays one reason why the “better
deterrence” argument may be inapplicable in the employee context.
The example posited by Shavell assumes that parties will be “locked
in” to the contract and will be unable to draw on past relations.155
The threat of arbitration is necessary to compel the one party not to
shirk its contractual duties.  But if the parties contemplate a series
of contracts instead of just one contract, then the potential shirker
will choose not to shirk in order to maintain the relationship.
Similarly, in the employment context, the employer need not
construct a superresponsive arbitration system in order to create the
proper precautionary incentives.  The employer can instead simply
enact the precautions in order to retain employees and spur them to
greater production.  After all, the employer knows that if employees
are harassed, they are free to leave.  Adding a level of
superarbitration to enforce antiharassment measures would create
an unnecessary cost.
Additionally, it seems unlikely that employees and employers are
forming these agreements in order to increase the deterrence of
statutory violations.  First, if employees were eager for more
deterrence, they would presumably be the more active party in
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156 See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at A1 (discussing how employers are requiring employees to sign
predispute arbitration agreements).
157 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 152, at 558.
158 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) (“The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance [as an arbitrator], because he cannot be
similarly informed.”).
159 Even when such arbitrators are determining whether an employee was fired for
discriminatory motives, they are determining whether the contractual for-cause provisions
have been violated rather than whether Title VII has been violated.  See Martin H. Malin &
Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice:  A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1205
(1993) (“The arbitrator at all times . . . is interpreting and applying the contract.”).
160 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
competence of arbitrators to analyze and decide purely legal issues in connection with
statutory claims has been questioned.”).
161 See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 152, at 559 (“Indeed, arbitration may reduce the
deterrence benefit if the parties are uncertain as to how the arbitral forum will interpret
contractual terms.”).
pursuing such agreements.  Employers, however, seem to be the
ones pushing for such agreements.156  Second, arbitrators are not
likely to be more accurate in assessing the validity of statutory
claims than courts.  In their article on arbitration in the context of
franchise agreements, Drahozal and Hylton emphasize the benefits
of having specialized arbitrators interpret complicated or indefinite
contractual terms.157  The arbitrators employed in the collective-
bargaining context are also thought to possess insight and
experience that enable them to better manage disputes between
unions and employers.158  In both cases, however, the arbitrator is
interpreting (and, over time, reinterpreting) provisions of a
particular contract.159  In the nonunion setting, however, arbitrators
are instead primarily called upon to interpret statutes, regulations,
and other provisions of law.  Arbitrators do not have the same type
of information advantage over the law that they do over a particular
contract.  In fact, one frequent criticism of nonunion employment
arbitration is that arbitrators do not properly apply the law.160  The
lack of published arbitral opinions makes arbitration outcomes even
more uncertain.  Overall, arbitration would seem to be a less certain
route for enforcement, which decreases, not increases, efficiency.161
Third, as I discussed earlier, even if it is possible, as Estreicher
argues, that arbitration increases the number of claims brought
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against the employer, those claims would be smaller and would not
necessarily increase the deterrence of prohibited activity.162  Overall,
although arbitration may provide greater deterrence in other
contractual contexts, it does not appear likely to do so in the
employment context.
5. Economies of Scale.  Another potential justification for a
predispute agreement could be an economies-of-scale argument.
Developing a system of arbitration incurs costs.  The employer must
first decide whether it would prefer arbitration to litigation—a
decision that should require some information gathering and
processing.  Then the system must be developed:  the procedural
rules, the potential pool of arbitrators, the locations for the
arbitrations, and many other details.  Generally such development
will require the assistance of counsel.  Once the system is
constructed, the employer must establish some method of
administering its processes.  Employees must perform such duties
as accepting forms, arranging pre-arbitration meetings, and
maintaining the arbitrator pool, or an outside agency must be paid
to do these things.  In many ways, the employer is responsible for
creating and maintaining its own system of justice and must provide
many of the services that public employees provide in the court
system.
It would be difficult for an employer to develop a system of
arbitration after a dispute has arisen.  The employer would have to
pour resources into a potential system while at the same time
pursuing litigation.  Under the predispute system, the employer
knows that resources devoted to developing the arbitration system
will be fruitfully spent.  In addition, each employee might have his
or her own set of requirements before agreeing to the arbitration.
Since each employee would have veto power over the arbitration, the
parties might spend a good deal of time haggling over the details.
Moreover, if only a few employees eventually opted to choose
arbitration, the employer could not spread its costs over a large pool
of disputes.  It might not make economic sense for an employer to
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164 See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 134, at 125-28 (setting forth Model Arbitration Act
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provide for arbitration if it could not guarantee that all its disputes
will be funneled through that system.163
There are two potential responses to this economies-of-scale
difficulty.  First, an employer could develop a system of arbitration
but only ask employees to agree to it after the dispute has arisen.
As noted in Part II, if arbitration is more economically efficient than
litigation, the parties will bargain and ultimately agree to it.164  The
employee might require some form of compensation in return for
agreeing to the arbitration, but the employer could provide the
compensation and still be better off.  Nothing prevents an employer
from developing an efficient system of arbitration and proposing its
use after the dispute has arisen.  Second, the costs of developing an
arbitration system may be going down as more groups provide “off-
the-rack” arbitration processes.  It may be easier and less expensive
for an employer to simply sign on with a group like the American
Arbitration Association and adopt its rules, procedures, and pool of
arbitrators.  Employees and their representatives are also more
likely to know about a system developed by a national organization
and may therefore be less concerned about the fairness of the
proceedings.  Commentators have also proposed their own versions
of a uniform or model arbitration procedure for parties to use.165
These developments are all likely to reduce the costs required in
developing an arbitral system.
Nevertheless, employers may be hesitant to invest any funds in
an arbitral system that employees will not embrace.  It is possible
that employees could reject arbitration even if it is in their economic
best interest.
B. PREVENTION OF IRRATIONAL POSTDISPUTE ARBITRATION REJECTION
A number of commentators argue that parties will never agree to
postdispute arbitration because plaintiffs and defendants have
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different sets of incentives.166  One forum will always have
advantages for one side that are disadvantages for the other.
However, economic theory teaches that the parties will not be stuck
with the default option if another option is more efficient.  Instead,
the parties will bargain to reach the most efficient alternative.
Thus, if the employee would prefer litigation but the employer would
choose arbitration, the parties would bargain to reach the most
efficient result.  If arbitration is more efficient, the employer will
provide some incentive for the employee to agree to it; if litigation is
more efficient, the employee will reject the employer’s offer and stay
with the default setting.167
Of course, not all transactions operate as smoothly in practice as
they do in theory.  Part II described why predispute arbitration
agreements may have trouble meeting the “perfect information”
requirement of the Coase Theorem.168  Postdispute agreements are
less complicated, and the necessary information is more attainable.
However, informational problems could also arise in the postdispute
context.  For example, employees and their representatives could
overestimate the degree of employer bias that arbitrators would
exhibit, leading them to undervalue the arbitration option.  Or
employers might overestimate their chances of success before a jury,
leading them to overvalue litigation.  Looking at all the factors, the
parties could have less than perfect information about the
probability of success in each forum (Pl and Pa), the likely relief
granted in each forum (Rl and Ra), and the costs of litigating in each
forum (Cl and Ca).  In fact, parties will most certainly lack perfect
information about these factors.  If both parties had perfect
information about Pl, Rl, and Cl, they would be able to settle every
time.
Of course, as noted in Part II, a large percentage of cases do
settle.169  Additionally, the information available at the postdispute
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stage is certainly better than the information at the predispute
stage.  Nevertheless, if parties routinely either lack the appropriate
information or make false assumptions about that information, they
may routinely make inefficient decisions.  In the employment
context, parties may routinely make inefficient decisions not to
choose postdispute arbitration based on a lack of data or on
misinformation about arbitration and litigation.  If choosing
arbitration is always or generally the most efficient option, then
predispute arbitration agreements may actually lead to more
efficient results.  The parties might be choosing the most efficient
result in the dark, but they would be getting there nonetheless.
What might lead parties to reject postdispute arbitration
inefficiently?  One potential scenario is that employees and their
attorneys might overestimate their likelihood of success in litigation
and underestimate their likelihood of success before an arbitrator.
Such misperceptions could be based on several factors.  First,
employees and their representatives might lack information about
the arbitral process.  Arbitration is a private form of dispute
resolution, and the results are generally kept between the parties.
“Hard” data, such as information about an arbitrator’s record of
adjudication, or “soft” data, such as information about the
arbitrator’s personal quirks and biases, may be hard to find or
unavailable.  In the absence of information, employees and their
representatives might conclude that arbitration is more employer-
friendly than it actually is.  They would therefore demand a higher
price to accept it—a price that the employer would find inefficient.
Second, employees and their representatives might be subject to
some of the decisionmaking heuristics described in Part II.170  For
example, employees might suffer from optimism bias in perceiving
their likelihood of success in litigation.171  They might focus on the
likelihood that they will win the maximum amount of damages at
trial and irrationally discount their likelihood of failure, as well as
the costs of trial.  Just as employees can be overly optimistic about
their likelihood of termination, they can be overly optimistic about
their likelihood of litigation success.  Moreover, parties may be
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between $2.25 and $2.50 for the mug, while sellers were willing to part with the mug for a
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subject to the “self-serving” bias, a term for the tendency of parties
to interpret facts and events in a way to confirm their preexisting
beliefs.172  This bias leads to a divergence between plaintiffs and
defendants over the likelihood of the claim’s success.173  This bias
could lead plaintiffs and defendants to overvalue their chance of
success in litigation, thereby skewing the results of their comparison
with arbitration.174
In addition, the behavioral characteristic known as the
“endowment effect” might affect employee perceptions.  The
endowment effect refers to the psychological phenomenon in which
individuals value what they have more than what they do not
have.175  In a famous experiment, researchers gave half of the
participants a mug.176  The researchers then independently asked
those with the mug how much money they would want for it and
asked those without the mug how much they would pay for it.177
Those with the mugs wanted significantly more for the mugs than
those without the mugs were willing to pay.178  The researchers
concluded that there was an endowment effect—people valued the
mug they had more than the mug they did not.179  In other words,
people will require more money to part with something than they
would pay to get it in the first place.180
The endowment effect causes problems for economic theory
because economics assumes that a person’s utility for a certain good
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at 567 (arguing that underlying incentives usually prevent parties from accepting postdispute
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or status does not vary based on context.  The Coase Theorem is
based on the premise that parties will bargain to reach the most
efficient result—no matter which party is endowed with the initial
legal entitlement.181  However, if people value a good or entitlement
more highly simply because they possess it, such entitlements will
be “stickier” than economic theory would predict.  The initial
assignment of the good or right may be more difficult to bargain
about because the holder will be less willing to part with it.182
Therefore, the endowment effect could complicate our model for
postdispute arbitration agreements.  Employees are “endowed” with
the right to take their case to court.  Thus, when asked to choose
between arbitration and litigation, employees may place a higher
value on litigation since they have the right in hand.  The
endowment effect complicates our expectation that employers and
employees will be able to bargain to reach the most efficient result.
The lack of information, coupled with potential behavioral
tendencies, may dampen or completely quash efforts by parties to
reach postdispute arbitration agreements.  Particularly when
combined with the start-up costs necessary to arbitrate, these factors
may lead to litigation when arbitration would be the more efficient
result.  Although we do not know how many parties agree to
postdispute arbitration, limited studies and anecdotal evidence
indicate that such agreements are rare in the employment context.183
However, if there are in fact only a small number of parties who
agree to arbitration after a dispute has arisen, there are several
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possible explanations for this.  First, the parties might be acting
efficiently, and arbitration might not provide the cost savings that
its proponents proclaim.  Second, the start-up costs may be too high
for parties to pursue arbitration on an ad hoc, postdispute basis.
Third, parties might lack the information to properly evaluate the
postdispute arbitration possibilities, and they may make improper
assumptions about the costs and benefits of arbitration and
litigation.  Finally, the parties could be irrationally rejecting
arbitration based on behavioral heuristics.
Although it is impossible to know at this point why postdispute
agreements are rare in the employment context, one potential
reason—a lack of information about arbitration—may not be a long-
term impediment.  As noted in Part II.A,184 the information
necessary to evaluate a postdispute arbitration agreement is the
type of information that attorneys must evaluate all the time.  Not
every case settles, but attorneys must constantly assess the P, R,
and C of litigation to determine when and at what price it makes
sense to settle.  Currently, however, it is difficult to determine the
P, R, and C of arbitration.  Arbitrations are generally private, and
parties can create their own unique systems, thus making
comparisons difficult.  As organizations like the American
Arbitration Association become more popular, however, arbitration
processes and procedures will become more of a known quantity.185
Moreover, these groups are endeavoring to provide more information
about the results of arbitrations (in redacted form) so that
evaluations of arbitrators themselves can be made.186  As arbitration
becomes a more popular option, more information will be available,
the process will have greater transparency, and parties will be able
to make better decisions.187
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Moreover, there is reason to doubt that behavioral heuristics are
leading to a significant number of inefficient decisions in the
postdispute context.  Certainly, the optimism bias might affect
individual plaintiffs, and the endowment effect might lead to a
plaintiff preference for litigation.  But in the context of most
postdispute situations, the employee-plaintiff will have the advice of
counsel.  Attorneys are regular and repeat market participants.
Unlike occasional participants, who fall back on heuristics to deal
with uncertain and unfamiliar decisions, attorneys must make
rational calculations in order to be successful in their practice.  In
the predispute context, the employee generally will not have the
advice of counsel.  Without such assistance, the employee is more
likely to fall back onto heuristics in making a decision.
Attorneys are certainly subject to optimism bias, self-serving bias,
and the endowment effect.  They might therefore demand too high
a price for agreeing to postdispute arbitration.  These biases,
however, also affect attorneys’ decisions to settle cases.  Thus,
decisions not to go to arbitration should be no more systematically
inefficient than decisions not to settle.  If there are any particular
inefficiencies in the postdispute arbitration context, I would suspect
they stem from attorney prejudices about arbitration based on lack
of information.  One would not be surprised to find plaintiffs’
attorneys suspicious of arbitration agreements.  In fact, a recent
survey of Chicago employment attorneys found that both plaintiffs’
and defense attorneys thought arbitrators were biased in favor of the
other side.188  There are, of course, a number of explanations for this
data:  One side is wrong, one side is lying, or both sides are overly
pessimistic.  But both sides might also be ignorant.  We distrust
what we do not understand.  As I will discuss further in Part IV,
courts and legislatures could take steps to eliminate some of the
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potential inefficiencies caused by a lack of information.189  But as I
noted earlier, I do not think this problem is as severe, in terms of its
efficiency consequences, as the information problem in the
predispute context.190
C. REDUCTION OF SOCIETAL EXTERNALITIES (OR GREATER SOCIETAL
EFFICIENCY)
A third potential argument for predispute arbitration agreements
is that they reduce externalities caused by litigation and thereby
increase societal efficiency.  Here I discuss two versions of this
argument:  (1) predispute agreements increase efficiency by
watering down employment law claims, and (2) predispute
agreements increase efficiency by reducing societal litigation costs.
1. Diluting Employment Law Claims.  Thus far we have assumed
that it is efficient for employees to have the legal protections to
which they are entitled.  If employment law claims represent a net
societal inefficiency, however, then societal efficiency would be
improved by diminishing or eliminating these claims.  For example,
if Title VII claims ultimately end up costing society more than they
create in benefits, then society would be better off if Title VII claims
were eliminated.  The most direct way to do this, of course, would be
to repeal Title VII.  But less direct methods could also have an effect.
If, as critics claim, predispute arbitration agreements are a way for
employers to elude some of their Title VII liability, then such
agreements are a method for diluting the inefficient effects of Title
VII.  The more biased the agreement, the better.  By effectively
acting as a waiver, biased predispute agreements could dilute or
eliminate employment law liability and thereby improve societal
efficiency.
Although I have not found any proponents of predispute
arbitration who make this claim, one criticism of the current system
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191 For example, David Sherwyn chastises critics of predispute arbitration who support the
current system of litigation.  Sherwyn, supra note 124, at 66.  He states:
These critics do not, however, even acknowledge that under [sic] the
current system may be unjust.  They do not discuss the fact that merit is
not the driving force in determining the resolution of a case.  They do not
mention that high cost of defense associated with litigation results in
incidences of “de facto severance” and other forms of systemic leveraging
to extort settlement for claims with no merit.  These individuals may not
care about employers’ costs of defense or the fact that arbitration reduces
incidence of “de facto severance” and other forms of systemic leveraging to
extort settlement for claims with no merit.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
192 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (“[F]ederal statutory
claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements . . . because the agreement only
determines the choice of forum.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
193 For more on this issue, see John J. Donahue, III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1411 (1986), and Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 513 (1987).
194 See supra notes 25-70 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
of employment law litigation has been that the system is biased
against employers and too permissive towards frivolous suits.191  If
the system is too corrupt, it would arguably be inefficient to
maintain it.  However, certainly no courts have justified predispute
arbitration on this basis; if anything, courts have stressed that
arbitration should have little or no effect on the underlying
resolution of employment law claims.192  Because this subject is
beyond the scope of this analysis, I will leave it for other
commentators.193
2. Reducing Societal Litigation Costs.  This Article’s model for pre
and postdispute arbitration agreements has focused solely on the
employee and the employer.194  And this Article has declared an
agreement to be efficient if it maximizes the utility of the two
parties.195  It has not, however, taken into account whether the two
parties might create external costs that would lead to greater
societal inefficiency but would be ignored by the parties themselves.
In other words, do decisions to arbitrate or litigate create societal
externalities?  And do predispute arbitration agreements reduce or
increase the incidence or significance of these externalities?
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196 In 2002, Congress allocated a budget of $4.6 billion to the federal judiciary.  Leonidas
Ralph Mecham, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 8 (2002), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt02/2002.pdf.
197 Since 1985 Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion for courthouse construction.
Id. at 2.
198 Individual jurors also absorb the opportunity costs of whatever they would have done
if they had not been selected for jury duty.
199 Expressed as an equation:  (.70 * $10,000) – $500 = $6,500 < (.70 * $10,000) – $400 =
$6,600.
The most obvious externality created by a decision to litigate is
the costs of running the judicial system.  Although parties are
obliged to pay filing fees, these minimal fees do not cover the costs
of running the judicial system.  Judges, clerks, court clerks,
administrative staff, security personnel, and building maintenance
staff must all be paid.196  Building construction or rental costs are
incurred, as are costs for office supplies, computer systems, and the
other standard necessities for a white-collar workplace.197  Juries
must be selected and paid.  The court systems (and thereby the
taxpayers) absorb most of these costs,198 minus the small amount
they receive in fees.  These costs represent a significant additional
set of burdens that society must shoulder in order to maintain the
availability of litigation.  If the parties choose arbitration, then the
parties pay for these costs.  Since the parties need not worry about
the societal costs of litigation, they are apt to ignore them—creating
an externality.
By way of example, let us return to the postdispute model.  As
noted, each party will choose arbitration over litigation if:
Pa * Ra – Ca > Pl * Rl – Cl.
For purposes of making a simple example, assume that the employee
has a 75% chance of winning $10,000 both in litigation and
arbitration.  In arbitration, the costs would be $500 for each party,
but in litigation they would be $400.  Since the costs of litigation are
lower than the costs of arbitration for each party, the parties would
both choose litigation over arbitration.199  
However, this model leaves out an important variable:  the costs
of litigation to society.  Until this point, all costs in the model have
been absorbed by the employee and the employer.  Thus, what was
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200 As noted in Part II.A., the parties will bargain to choose the most efficient result even
if the parties have differing expenses for each process.  See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
201 The expected cost of the litigation is $1,000, since we would know ahead of time
whether the case would get to trial.
202 Arbitration’s total costs would be $500 + $500 = $1,000.  Litigation’s total costs would
be $400 + $400 + $500 = $1,300.
203 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 237 (1996)
efficient for them jointly has been efficient for society as a whole.
But the parties do not have to absorb all of the costs of litigating a
case and, therefore, may not take them into account when deciding
on the most efficient option.  The parties would ultimately make
their choice based on what is most efficient between them,
represented by the equation:
– JCa as compared with – JCl.
JC is the joint costs of both parties.200  From society’s standpoint,
however, arbitration would be more efficient than litigation when
the following equation is satisfied:
– JCa > – JCl – SCl.
In this equation, SCl represents the social costs of litigation.  If SCl
is greater than zero, then there may be some cases in which the
parties will choose litigation when, from society’s perspective, it
would be more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration.
Returning to the current example, let us assume that if the parties
took the case to court, the court system would incur a cost of an
additional $500 processing the case and administering the trial.201
If we add the costs to both parties and the costs to the court system,
arbitration clearly is more efficient.202  However, the parties do not
absorb these costs and therefore would choose litigation.  Their
choice would be efficient as between the two of them but inefficient
from a societal viewpoint.
Perhaps a view to societal efficiency is one reason many courts
have been eager to uphold predispute arbitration agreements.  After
all, courts know better than anyone else the societal costs that
litigation incurs.203  Instead of imagining yourself as an employee,
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federal courts have become increasingly hospitable to arbitration.”); Cole, supra note 9, at 449
(“Taking the task into their own hands, judges, in an attempt to reduce their workload without
increasing costs or delays, have embraced arbitration as an alternate means for resolving
disputes.”).
204 See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 306 (“These [cases founded on employment
disputes] are often tedious cases, involving angry parties and mostly fact-bound
disagreements.  It is not the kind of litigation that most judges prefer to manage.”).
205 Arbitration has long been a staple in the union context, and the Supreme Court has
upheld wide powers for arbitrators in the collective bargaining context, most notably in the
Steelworkers Trilogy.  United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960).
206 An important issue in predispute arbitration agreements is whether the employer must
bear the costs of the arbitration.  See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
imagine yourself as a federal judge.  You know your docket has a
substantial number of employment-related cases.  These cases often
revolve around questions of fact rather than questions of law, and
the stakes are small compared with heady constitutional questions
or complex business transactions.204  Along comes a new avenue for
these claims—a method of dispute resolution that is familiar to
judges from the union context.205  The parties—or often just the
employer—absorb most of the costs of this new system.206
Theoretically, this system could be a cheaper and more accurate
method of resolving difficult employment disputes, and the costs are
borne directly by the litigants.  From an efficiency (as well as an
institutional) perspective, predispute agreements seem fairly
attractive.
Of course, litigation costs are not purely dead weight.  Most of the
benefits from litigation are ex ante, in that the potential for
litigation deters parties from engaging in illegal conduct.  If an
arbitration system failed to enforce a party’s rights in the same
manner as the judicial system, society would lose efficiency as illegal
behavior increased.  Just as the costs of litigation are compared with
the costs of arbitration, the deterrent effects of litigation must be
balanced against the deterrent effects of arbitration.  If arbitration
is too biased toward employers, such that employers feel more free
to engage in prohibited activities or reduce their precautionary
measures, societal costs from increased illegal activity will
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certain types of provisions may “undermine[ ] the deterrent effect of the antidiscrimination
statutes”).
208 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that
underlying purpose of litigation is to explicate common values and norms, which settlement
does not do).
209 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (holding EEOC claim not
restricted by mandatory arbitration agreement).
increase—and may overtake the institutional cost savings.207  Thus,
if courts were attracted to arbitration as a method of increasing
social efficiency, they would need to maintain a level of fairness for
the arbitral process sufficient to keep a proper level of deterrence.
Some commentators have pointed to another potential cost of
arbitration—the loss of judicial decisions on critical issues in the
law.  Arbitration agreements often keep the results of any particular
arbitration a secret.  Not all agreements require written decisions.
For those that do, the parties may place restrictions on their own
ability to publicize such opinions.  As more disputes are diverted into
arbitration, there will be fewer litigated cases and thus fewer
published decisions.  The end result will be a sparser and poorer
legal landscape, where statutory rights remain stagnant and the law
does not adapt to societal change.208  It is difficult to measure the
costs and benefits from judicial decisions at a societal level.
Certainly, such decisions have important benefits—they provide
further explication and development of the law.  Law without
written opinions would be hard to fathom.  And many of the
employment laws—particularly the Americans with Disabilities
Act—are relatively new and require a great deal of judicial exegesis.
Judicial decisions, however, also have costs for both the parties and
society.  Settlement is generally considered the most efficient way of
resolving a dispute.  There may be some ratio of societal disputes to
judicial opinions that maintains the optimal level of growth in the
law, but I know of no research that has attempted to generate such
a number.  Moreover, the law would continue to develop even under
a system where predispute arbitration agreements are enforced.  Not
all employers or employees will enter into predispute agreements.
The EEOC can still bring suits on behalf of individual employees to
assert the employees’ federal employment law rights, even if those
employees are covered by an arbitration agreement.209  Through its
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210 See Estreicher, supra note 129, at 1356 (noting that greater use of arbitration by
individual employees frees up administrative agencies to pursue systemic litigation).
211 For a suggestion in this regard, see Monica J. Washington, Note, Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:  Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 863 (1999).
212 An arbitration agreement required by Hooters of America contained all of these.
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
213 Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656 (1995); see also Mark Berger, Can Employment Law
claim intake process, the EEOC can select those cases that raise
novel issues of law and ensure that the issues receive a judicial
hearing.210  Finally, if these mitigating factors are deemed
insufficient, society could permit courts to review arbitration
decisions that concern novel issues of law.211
Ultimately, I think the issue of societal efficiency presents the
most persuasive argument for predispute arbitration.  By enforcing
predispute agreements, the courts have overseen the creation of a
new system of dispute resolution paid for by the parties themselves.
If the arbitral forum is truly as fair as its proponents submit, then
society gets a cheaper form of adjudication without any
corresponding loss in deterrence.  Of course, whether predispute
agreements are generally fair is still open to investigation.  Given
the potential for employer opportunism, I would hesitate to suggest
such agreements are fair without substantial evidence. 
IV.  THOUGHTS ON THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEBATE
Critics of predispute arbitration agreements generally focus on
the potential for unfair arbitration procedures.  Unfair procedures
such as the following may stack the deck against employees:
Employees may have drastically shortened statutes of limitation,
they may have to provide discovery from which the employer is
exempt, employers may control the choice of arbitrators or the pool
of potential arbitrators, and employers may provide themselves with
rights of notice or appeal not provided to employees.212  Even with
fair procedures, arbitration may arguably be tilted against
employees if the arbitrators themselves are biased.  According to
some commentators, the repeat-player effect enables employers to
have more familiarity with arbitrators,213 and arbitrators may
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Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 693, 714 (1993) (“[S]ince employers rather than
individual employees are more likely to have repeat participation in the employment dispute
arbitration process, arbitrators are more likely to rule in their favor in order to increase their
chances of being selected to arbitrate future claims.”); Alleyne, supra note 10, at 426 (noting
temptation for arbitrators to favor institutional employer interests).
214 Cole, supra note 9, at 478.
215 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (interpreting FAA to
exclude only workers directly involved in interstate transportation).
216 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
217 Id.
218 See id. at 26 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.’ ”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
219 Id. at 28.
consciously or unconsciously favor employers since employers
administer and often pay for the arbitration system.214
Now that the Supreme Court has made clear that the FAA’s
provisions apply to almost all employees,215 state and lower federal
courts have set about the task of defining the limits of acceptable
arbitration procedures.  But a fundamental question remains:  How
is that debate to be framed?  Will it be framed primarily by contract
law, which focuses on the voluntary agreement between the two
parties?  Or will courts find that arbitration procedures must have
a certain level of procedural fairness in order to protect the deterrent
and remedial purposes of the underlying statutes?  The Supreme
Court’s Gilmer decision provides support for both perspectives.  On
the one hand, Gilmer cites the FAA for the proposition that
arbitration agreements should be enforced “save upon such grounds
as exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.”216  The Court noted
that “fraud or overwhelming economic power” may justify
contractual revocation but found such doctrines were not present in
that case.217  On the other hand, Gilmer also makes clear that
arbitration is only permissible if a party does not lose any
substantive rights as a result of the agreement.218  The Court
appears to require, as a condition of arbitration, that the
“prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum.”219  In this context, the Court
reviewed several procedural provisions in the arbitration agreement,
including those related to the selection of arbitrators and limitations
on discovery and class actions.  It held that there was “no showing”
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220 Id. at 30-32.
221 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003).
222 Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
223 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2001); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000).  Other courts have also discussed
unconscionability in the context of employment arbitration agreements.  See, e.g., Alexander
v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding thirty-day time limit,
restrictions on relief, and “loser pays” provision to be unconscionable); Morrison, 317 F.3d at
666-67 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding the agreement not to be unconscionable); Wilcox v. Valero Ref.
Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding application of arbitration agreement
to conduct that happened before agreement not unconscionable).
224 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
225 E.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 667-68; Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180
(3d Cir. 1999); Faber v. Menard, 267 F. Supp. 2d 961, 972 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
226 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
227 Id.  The court noted:
that such procedures “[would] prove insufficient” for the vindication
of the statutory claims.220  As one circuit court noted, this approach
is necessary to prevent unfair agreements that “would enable
employers to evade the requirements of federal law altogether.”221
In a recent case concerning consumer arbitration, the Supreme
Court discussed both perspectives as a joint test:  “In determining
whether statutory claims may be arbitrated, we first ask whether
the parties agreed to submit their claims to arbitration, and then ask
whether Congress has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”222
State and federal courts have considered both of these approaches
in reviewing predispute employment arbitration agreements.  In
striking down arbitration agreements on contractual grounds,
California and the Ninth Circuit (interpreting California law) have
relied on the doctrine of unconscionability.223  In the Hooters case,
the Fourth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement violated the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.224  Some courts have discussed
the doctrines of consideration and mutuality of obligation.225
However, courts have also looked to whether arbitration procedures
are sufficiently fair to vindicate underlying substantive rights.  For
example, the D.C. Circuit in Cole v. Burns International Security
Services226 upheld an arbitration agreement based on the procedural
fairness of the agreement.  The court set forth five procedural
requirements for arbitral agreements, and found that the
requirements were met in the instant case.227  Other courts have
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We believe that all of the factors addressed in Gilmer are satisfied here.
In particular, we note that the arbitration arrangement (1) provides for
neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3)
requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that
would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees
to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a
condition of access to the arbitration forum.  Thus, an employee who is
made to use arbitration as a condition of employment “effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”
Id. at 1482 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
228 See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding
employee must arbitrate if he cannot prove fee-shifting prohibits exercise of federal statutory
rights); DeOrnellas v. Aspen Square Mgmt., 295 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding
cost-sharing provision of agreement invalid because of cost to substantive rights).
229 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).  Randolph concerned consumer, rather than employment,
arbitration.  Id. at 94.
230 Id. at 90.  The Court resolved the contract issue in a brief sentence.  See id. (“In this
case, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate all claims relating to their contract,
including claims involving statutory rights.”).
231 Id. at 90-91.
232 Id. at 92 (“Similarly, we believe that where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that
party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”).
employed a similar “effect-on-substantive-rights” analysis in
reviewing certain arbitral procedures.228
One procedural issue that has been analyzed under both
contractual and substantive-rights approaches is the cost-splitting
provision in some arbitration agreements.  Since the parties are
paying for the entire costs of arbitration, those costs may reach
significant levels.  Although some employers offer to pay for the bulk
of arbitration costs in their arbitration agreements, other employers
require the costs of arbitration to be split between the parties.  In
Green Tree Financial Corp.—Alabama v. Randolph,229 the Supreme
Court focused primarily on the substantive-rights analysis,
recognizing that “the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”230  The Court, however, was
unwilling to say that the possibility of such preclusion was enough
to impair substantive rights.231  Ultimately, the Court adopted a
case-by-case approach to this issue, holding that parties bear the
burden of establishing that costs will be prohibitive.232
Lower courts have differed over whether such cost-splitting
arrangements are enforceable.  Some courts have held such
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with the employer would alone render an arbitration agreement substantively
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234 E.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999);
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.
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237 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 3 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal. 2000).
Accordingly, consistent with the majority of jurisdictions to consider this
issue, we conclude that when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration
as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration
process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense
that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to
bring the action in court.
Id.
238 See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
inquiry into typical “job description and socioeconomic background” of potential litigant should
be undertaken).
239 See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556.
We believe that the appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the
agreements unenforceable on contractual grounds.  The Ninth
Circuit has held cost-splitting arrangements to be substantively
unconscionable.233  Most courts, however, have followed Randolph’s
lead and analyzed such arrangements as a substantive-rights issue.
Prior to Randolph, some courts suggested that cost splitting
arrangements were per se unenforceable.234  After Randolph, courts
have adopted the Court’s case-by-case approach, asking claimants to
prove that the costs of arbitration are “so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims.”235  However, courts have differed on what kind
of costs deter claims.236  One school of thought has held that any
costs above and beyond those assessed as court costs and filing fees
deter such claims and therefore affect substantive rights.237  Another
approach favors an analysis of whether the costs are actually high
enough to deter the bringing of claims.  In this regard, the Sixth
Circuit asks whether costs are potentially high enough to chill a
class of potential litigants.238  The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand,
inquires into whether the actual arbitral costs in a particular
instance prevent the particular litigant from having an adequate
and accessible substitute forum.239  These fractured approaches have
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arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute
to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things,
upon the claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the
expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and
whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
claims.
Id.
240 Leroy & Feuille, supra note 236, at 177.  District courts, however, ordered arbitration
in 77% of cases in which cost was raised as an issue.  Id.
241 See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
led to divergent results.  An empirical study of reported cases on the
issue found that appellate courts ordered arbitration in only half of
the cases in which claimants contested cost-splitting
arrangements.240
The framing of the analysis concerning these procedural issues
will have a profound effect on how these issues are determined.  If
they are scrutinized under the lens of contract law, the primary
issue will be whether these parties reached a free and voluntary
agreement to arbitrate under the specified circumstances.  If they
are examined for their effects on substantive rights, the issue
becomes the actual impact of the particular procedure on the
underlying arbitration.  There are reductive perils to either
approach.  Analyzed as a contract law issue, if the parties have in
fact both agreed to the arbitration contract, the effects of the actual
procedures—no matter how draconian—would appear meaningless.
On the other hand, arbitral procedures of necessity have an impact
on the underlying adjudication; in fact, the parties have theoretically
chosen arbitration to take advantage of those procedures.  Thus, the
question of “effect” is too simple.  Determining whether a particular
procedure has a certain level of effect on substantive
rights—“substantial” effect, perhaps, or “preclusive” effect—is an
exercise that is ultimately more about a court’s view on the merits
of arbitration.
My hope is that the model set forth in Part II241 will provide a new
basis for courts and commentators to analyze the contractual issues
surrounding predispute arbitration agreements.  The complexity of
the model calls into question whether such agreements are based on
adequate cost-benefit analyses.  It seems likely that employees
cannot make such analyses and instead fall back onto
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decisionmaking heuristics in agreeing to arbitration.  Thus, the fact
that both parties have “agreed” to the provision does not mean both
parties have arrived at a meaningful decision that the provision will
make them better off.  Once this uncertainty has been
acknowledged, we may then move to the next round of scrutiny:
whether such agreements should be enforced.  As mentioned earlier,
imperfections in the bargaining process do not require that a
contract be held unenforceable.  However, the information gap in the
predispute context provides a significant reason for subjecting
predispute agreements to an unconscionability analysis.
Interestingly, courts that find such agreements to be unconscionable
have not focused on the information gap but have instead relied on
such concepts as “unequal bargaining power” and “contracts of
adhesion.”242  A deeper understanding of the information gap would
make these terms less of a placeholder and provide stronger grounds
for a finding of unconscionability.243
Moreover, the existence of the information gap points to two
directions for future reforms of the arbitration process.  One
direction would involve greater scrutiny by courts of the terms of
each agreement for its procedural fairness.  Given the information
gap, this ongoing scrutiny makes sense because employees have not
had the wherewithal to police such terms themselves.  Moreover,
standard requirements for arbitration agreements would reduce the
information necessary to evaluate each agreement, since employees
would know that the agreement would at least have to adhere to a
certain level of fairness.  A second direction, however, would be to
80 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
244 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 216-17 (1997) (discussing potential for disclosure concerning arbitrator
bias).
require that more information be generated about the arbitral
process.  Requiring published arbitral opinions, for example, would
allow employees greater access to information about the quality of
the arbitral forum.  The “win rates” for employers and employees for
a particular arbitrator might also be useful information in
evaluating potential bias.244  Perhaps employers might be required
to provide a copy of arbitration rules and procedures or their own
success rates in arbitration.  Information about claims filed against
the employer would provide employees with a sense of their risk of
needing to file such a claim.  As more information becomes available
to employees, employers, and the counsel who work with each, the
parties will have a better sense of the costs and benefits of
arbitration and the wisdom of agreeing to arbitrate employment
claims.
There are dangers to both mandatory procedures and greater
disclosure.  Arbitration is attractive in part due to its flexibility and
adaptability to particular environments.  Mandatory terms would
restrict the parties’ ability to develop a system of arbitration tailored
to their needs.  Similarly, greater disclosure would entail higher
arbitral costs, as arbitrators and employers would need to develop
and publish this information.  When balanced against the costs of
unfair arbitration agreements, however, these potential dangers
may constitute a better alternative.  Ultimately, we can hope that
employers and employees will be able to engage in meaningful
negotiations over arbitration agreements that are societally efficient
and benefit both parties.  But we are not there yet.
V.  CONCLUSION
If the ideology behind law and economics is about freeing people
to make rational decisions about their own utility, then it would be
in line with this ideology—perhaps counterintuitively—to hold
predispute employment arbitration agreements unenforceable.  As
I believe the foregoing models have demonstrated, employees are in
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a much better position to judge the efficiency of arbitration and
litigation after a dispute has arisen.  Locking in employees ahead of
time restrains their ability to make informed decisions.  To justify
predispute arbitration agreements, there should be a reason for
employees to be locked in.  Merely showing that arbitration in and
of itself is cheap and fair does not explain why parties cannot choose
it after the dispute has arisen.
There is a story to tell, however, about how predispute arbitration
agreements may end up increasing societal efficiency.  By shuttling
parties into a (theoretically) quicker and cheaper form of dispute
resolution, society may save money on judicial administration and
litigation costs.  Requiring the parties to pay for their own dispute
resolution provides them with an incentive to keep costs down.  And
if we expect employers to pick up the bulk of this sum, as some
courts have suggested, then allowing employers to lock all of their
employees into a predispute arbitration system might be the only
way for employers to recoup the costs of creating the system.  It
would be up to courts to require a combination of mandatory
procedures and disclosures that would allow employers and
employees to make informed, efficient decisions about such
agreements.  But in the meantime, society needs to recognize that
employees do not have the informational resources to make accurate
efficiency decisions about predispute arbitration agreements.
